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The Punishment Need Not Fit the Crime:
Harmelin v. Michigan
and the Eighth Amendment
I. INTRODUCTION
Ronald Harmelin was convicted of possession of 650 or more grams
of cocaine and sentenced under Michigan law to mandatory life impris-
onment without possibility of parole.' Ronald Harmelin had no prior
felony convictions.! He was not convicted of dealing or transporting or
having the intent to distribute or transport the drug.3 Nevertheless,
Ronald Harmelin was sentenced to the harshest possible penalty avail-
able under Michigan law. No other jurisdiction punished his crime as
severely.' Despite these facts, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the conviction and held that a mandatory sentence of life impris-
onment without possibility of parole for a first offense of drug posses-
sion was not a "cruel and unusual" punishment within the meaning of
the Eighth Amendment.6
Thus, the "War on Drugs" rages on.7 Despite launching the most ex-
pensive crusade against illegal drugs in our history in 1988,8 America's
addiction to narcotics has proven a difficult scourge to conquer." The
1. People v. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d 75, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), appeal denied,
434 Mich. 863 (1990), 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
333.7 403(2)(a)(i) (West 1992).
2. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2718 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
3. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
4. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Michigan does not have a death penalty. Id. (White,
J., dissenting).
5. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Alabama punished first-time drug offenders with life
imprisonment without possibility of parole only when the amount of the narcotic was
ten kilograms or more. Id. (White, J., dissenting). See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-231(2)(d)
(Supp. 1992).
6. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2701.
7. See infra note 338-49 and accompanying text.
8. The budget for federal anti-drug efforts in fiscal year 1992 was almost $12
billion. Joseph B. Treaster, THE 1992 CAMPAIGN: Candidates' Records; Four Years
of Bush's Drug War: New Funds but an Old Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1992, at
Al. Almost two-thirds of this total will go to enforcement, with the balance used for
education and treatment. Id.
9. Id. In 1985, federal surveys showed that 12.2 million Americans used cocaine
federal government has used the awesome weapons at its disposal to
combat the growing drug tide by sealing our borders, destroying drug
crops at home and abroad, and imprisoning drug offenders for ever-
lengthening terms.0
No one suggests that illicit drugs do not have their cost." The "War
on Drugs," however, has costs of its own. 2 After Harmelin v. Michi-
gan,3 it appears that the right to a punishment proportionate to the
underlying crime4 has become another casualty of war.
In Harmelin, the Supreme Court held that a sentence of life in prison
without possibility of parole for possession of 650 grams or more of
cocaine" did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment." In sec-
tion V of Justice Scalia's opinion,7 the Court ruled that "severe, man-
at least occasionally. By 1990,, that number had dropped to 6.2 million occasional us-
ers, while 662,000 Americans reported using cocaine weekly. However, the 1991
survey showed that 6.4 million Americans used cocaine occasionally and 654,000 used
cocaine weekly. Taking into account the margin of error, the surveys suggest that
progress in the "War on Drugs" is levelling off. Id.
Other data show that the drug war is far from over. For example, since 1988,
the number of Americans reporting that they used crack occasionally has been steady
at about one million people. Id. Additionally, emergency room incidents involving
cocaine use actually rose 25% in the first three quarters of 1991. Id.
10. Id. For example, New York's Director of Criminal Justice and Commissioner of
the Division of Criminal Justice Services, Richard H. Girgenti, estimates that about
half of those incarcerated in New York state prisons are convicted drug offenders.
Donna Greene, Westchester Q&A: Richard H. Girgenti; Deciding Which Criminals Go
to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1992, at 12WC3; see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370
(1982) (involving a sentence of 40 years and a fine of $20,000 for possession and
distribution of a small amount of marijuana); see generally Steven Wisotsky, Crack-
doum: The Emerging. "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 889
(1987).
11. According to the Department of Health and Human Services, drug and alcohol
addiction costs the United States an estimated $140 billion dollars annually. Kimberly
C. Moore, Bi-Partisan Leadership Calls for New War on Drugs Strategy, STATES
NEWS SERv., June 4, 1992. Up to 4096 of industrial deaths and 47% of industrial inju-
ries can be linked to drug or alcohol abuse. Cristina Lee, Recovery; Getting a Career
Going Again; Ex-Drinkers, Drug Users Get Help, LA. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992, at DI.
Ten to twenty-three percent of all workers use drugs while at work. Id, Drug-abusing
employees miss work three to five times more than other employees, and have three
times their medical costs. Id.
12. See Wisotsky, supra note 10, at 900-06.
13. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
14. See iqfra notes 109-37 and accompanying text.
15. People v. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d 75, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); see also MicH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 333.7403(2)(a)(i) (West 1992).
16. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2701; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
17. Section V was the only part of the opinion in which the majority joined.
Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702. Harmelin produced five separate opinions, including
three dissents.
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datory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitu-
tional sense, having been employed in various forms throughout our
Nation's history."' As for the mitigating factors in Harmelin," the
Court noted it had "drawn the line of required individualized sentencing
at capital cases, and (saw] no basis for extending it further."'
This Comment discusses the history of the proportionality guarantee
in American jurisprudence in Part II. Part HI describes the facts and
procedural history of Harmelin. Part IV critiques the opinions, and
attempts to show where proportionality stands after Harmelin. Part V
examines Harmelin's effect on proportionality as a component of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as well as Harmelin's impact on the
growing "drug exception" to the Bill of Rights. Part VI concludes that
after Harmelin the future of the proportionality principle is in question
and, if it does apply to sentences of imprisonment, it will only apply in
the most extreme cases.2 '
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. " ' The framers of the
United States Constitution borrowed the language of the Eighth Amend-
ment directly from the Virginia Constitution of 1776, which derived its
language from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.'
18. Id. at 2701. See infra notes 165-87 and accompanying text.
19. For example, Ronald Harmelin was convicted for possession of cocaine; the
State did not prove that he was dealing the drug or that he had possession with
intent to distribute. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2717 (White, J., dissenting). Ronald
Harmelin had no prior felony convictions. Id. at 2701. There was no evidence that he
committed any acts of violence. Id. at 2716-17 (White, J., dissenting). But see id at
2706 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the very nature of Harmelin's crime en-
tailed violence).
20. Id. at 2702. See infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
21. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.11 (1980). A* penalty of life impris-
onment for a parking violation might constitute such a case. Id.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
23. Nancy Keir, Note, Solem v. Helm: Extending Judicial Review Under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause to Require "Proportionality" of Prison Sentences,
33 CATH. L REv. 479, 481 (1984); see also Daryl P. Rush, Constitutional
Law--Safeguarding Eighth Amendment Rights with a Comparative Proportionality
Review in the Imposition of the Death Penalty: Pulley v. Harris, 28 How. ,J. 331
(1985). In adopting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, Patrick Henry argued
There is sparse legislative history available as to what the framers
intended by the phrase "cruel and unusual." The Eighth Amendment
was traditionally interpreted as prohibiting torture and other barbarous
punishments,' such as occurred during the "Bloody Assize" in England
in the late seventeenth century.' Many scholars contend that the Eng-
lish Bill of Rights of 1689, and specifically the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause, were created as a reaction to the barbarities of the
"Bloody Assize."" However, historian Anthony Granucci disputes this
view on several grounds." Granucci suggests that the "Bloody Assize"
did not trigger the Declaration of Rights; rather, the perjury trial of
Titus Oates in 1685 prompted its creation.' Granucci contends that the
that it imposed a limitation on Congress' ability to legislate punishments. Id. at 334.
24. See Charles Walter Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and
the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 378, 378 &
n.6 (1980).
25. See id. at 378. In 1685, James H appointed a special commission to try the
participants of the Duke of Monmouth's unsuccessful rebellion. Id. Lord Chief Justice
Jeffreys of the King's Bench led the commission, which convicted hundreds of sus-
pected rebels of treason. Id, One convicted man was executed by being hanged by
the neck and cut down while still alive. Id. He was then disembowelled and had his
bowels burned before him. Id. Then he was beheaded and quartered. Id. Female
felons were simply burned alive. Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted". The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L REV. 839, 856 (1969).
26. See Mark Alden James, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis: The Lim-
its of Moral Inquiry, 26 ARiz. L REV. 871, 871 n.4 (1984).
27. Granucci, supra note 25, at 855-56. First, the methods of punishment used in
the "Bloody Assize" were used even after Parliament enacted the Bill of Rights. Id. at
865. Second, the chief prosecutor of the "Bloody Assize," Sir Henry Pollfexen, was a
leading member of the committee that drafted the Bill of Rights. Granucci finds it
"unlikely that he would have drafted a document condemning his own previous
actions." Id. at 856. Third, since the "Bloody Assize" was mentioned only once during
the House of Commons debate on the Bill of Rights, it would appear that the Bill
was not in fact a reaction to its excesses. Id.
28. Id. at 856-67. In September of 1678, Oates, a minister in the Church of Eng-
land, announced that he had uncovered a plot to kill King Charles. Id. Although
Charles was a Protestant, his brother James and Queen Catherine were Catholics. Id.
The alleged assassination- attempt was to be carried out by two Jesuit priests, fol-
lowed by an invasion of Catholic armies to install James on the throne. Id. This
would subject England to Roman rule, one of the greatest fears of the age. Id. In the
resulting hysteria, 15 Catholics were executed for treason. Id. at 857.
After the succession of James II to the throne, Oates was tried and convicted of
perjury. "[He] was sentenced to (1) a fine of 2000 marks, (2) life imprisonment, (3)
whippings, (4) pillorying four times a year, and () [defrocldng]." Id. at 858. Oates
petitioned for relief from the sentence after William of Orange became sovereign in
1689. Id. Though the House of Lords rejected the petition, the minority dissent pro-
vides Insight into the contemporary meaning of the phrase "cruel and unusual." The
particular methods of Oates' punishment were not disputed; rather, the dissenters
based their objection on the sentence being contrary to the law and outside the
court's jurisdiction. Id. at 859.
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severity of Oates' sentence for his perjury conviction sparked objection
based on the belief that punishments should in proportion to the
crime.'
English law had supported the principle of proportionality in punish-
ments from early in its history, tracing the origins of proportional pun-
ishments to the lex ta/icnis-the Biblical law of "an eye for an eye, a
tooth for a tooth.' a When the American framers of the Bill of Rights
borrowed from England the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments,"
they quite possibly meant to adopt its history and interpretations. The
Court in Solem v. Helm"' suggested that the Eighth Amendment's use
of language sinilar to that of the English Bill of Rights is evidence of
such an intent.2 Despite this argument, Granucci contends that the
framers misinterpreted the phrase as prohibiting only torture and bar-
barous punishments.'
What little evidence exists as to the intended meaning of the Eighth
Amendment suggests that it was indeed aimed at preventing barbarous
modes of punishment.' This is how the Amendment was interpreted
29. Id, at 860. Granucci's view is not uncontested. William of Orange may have
released Oates simply because Oates indirectly helped him gain the throne. Also,
disproportionate penalties continued long after the Bill of Rights was passed. Addi-
tionally, the proportionality principle was never mentioned during the debates in
Parliament leading up to the ratification of the Bill of Rights. See Schwartz, supra
note 24, at 380-81.
30. Granucci, supra note 25, at 844-47.
31. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
32. 1& at 286.
33. Granucci, supra note 25 at 865. Whether or not the English meaning behind
the phrase "cruel and unusual" should affect its meaning in American jurisprudence is
subject to debate. See Schwartz, supra note 24, at 380.
34. The following discussion took place before the adoption of the Eighth
Amendment-
"MR. SMITH, of South Carolina, objected to the words "nor cruel and
unusual punishments;" the import of them being too indefinite.
MR. LIVERMORE [of New Hampshire]-the clause seems to express a
great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but it
seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary .... No cruel
and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang
a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off;
but are we in the future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments
because they are cruel?
The question was put on the clause, and it was agreed to by a consider-
able majority."
Granucci, supra note 25, at 842 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782-83 (1789)).
throughout most of the nineteenth century.'
It was not until O'Neil v. Vermont,TM in 1892, that a proportionality
component began to emerge in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.' In
O'Neil, the defendant was convicted of 307 separate counts of selling
liquor without a license.' He was frned $20 for each offense, totalling
$6,140. In addition, O'Neill was charged $497.96 for prosecution costs
and seventy-six cents for commitment costs until the fine was paid,
bringing his total fine to $6,638.72.TM O'Neil argued that the Vermont
law prohibiting sale of liquor to non-residents without a license contra-
dicted the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court
ruled that because the petitioner failed to raise this point or any Eighth
Amendment claim at trial, no federal question existed on appeal; thus
the Court lacked jurisdiction.'
However, Justice Field, in his dissenting opinion, objected to the
sentence as "exceeding in severity, considering the offenses of which
the defendant was convicted."" Justice Field argued that O'Neil's pun-
ishment was greater than that which he could have received had he
committed burglary, highway robbery, manslaughter, forgery, or perju-
ry.' Considering the punishment in relation to the crime, Justice Field
found it "both cruel and unusual."' While admitting that the Eighth
Amendment usually prohibited only barbarous punishments, he stated
that it also prevented "all punishments which by their excessive length
35. See infra note 179 for early state court interpretations of the Eighth Amend-
ment
36. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
37. Prior to ONeil, in Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1867), the
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the states, and
even if it did, it would not apply to a punishment of a $54 fine and three months in
jail because it was the "usual mode" the states used to deter the evils of intemper-
ance. Id. at 480. In Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), the Court ruled that the
Eighth Amendment did not prohibit death by firing squad, because it was a common
method of military execution and did not involve torture or unnecessary cruelty. Ld.
at 134-35. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), applied the Wilkinson rationale and
upheld electrocution as consistent with the dictates of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at
447. Electrocution was not, of course, a common punishment throughout history.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that the New York Legislature had a valid pur-
pose in selecting it as a method of punishment Id.
38. O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 327.
39. Id. at 330. O'Neil was to serve out the fine at three dollars a day, or 54 years,
at hard labor. Id. at 331.
40. Id. at 335-37. The Court also stated that, in any event, the Eighth Amendment
would not apply because it only applied to the federal government, not to the states.
Id. at 331-32.
41. Id. at 338 (Field, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 339 (Field, J., dissenting).
43. Id. (Field, J., dissenting).
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or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged."" Jus-
tice Field pointed out that the penalty was not justified as a penalty for
cumulative offenses because although 'the State may, indeed, make the
drinking of one drop of liquor an offense to be punished by imprison-
ment, . . . it would be an unheard of cruelty if it should count the drops
in a single glass and make thereby a thousand offenses."' In a sepa-
rate dissent, Justice Harlan concurred with Justice Field that the sen-
tence violated the Eighth Amendment.'
A. United States v. Weems
In 1910, the United States Supreme Court decided United States v.
Weems."7 Weens is regarded as the seminal case in recognizing a princi-
ple of proportionality in the Eighth Amendment.' However, Weems did
not even involve an interpretation of the United States Constitution.'
Instead, the Court was concerned with the Constitution of the Philip-
pines, which incorporated language identical to the Eighth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.'
In Weerns, the defendant was convicted of falsifying an official docu-
ment and was sentenced to "cadena temporal.""' This punishment in-
cluded imprisonment for twelve to twenty years, at hard and painful
labor while chained by the wrists and ankles.' In addition, various civ-
44. Id. at 33940 (Field, J., dissenting). Shortly after O'Neil was decided, the defen-
dants in Howard v. North Carolina, 191 U.S. 126 (1903), argued Justice Field's posi-
tion. In Howard, two defendants were sentenced to ten years for conspiracy to de-
fraud. A third defendant received a seven-year sentence. The Court held that the ten-
year sentences did not violate the Eighth Amendment simply because the third defen-
dant received a shorter sentence for the same crime. Id. at 135-36.
45. O'NeiU, 144 U.S. at 340 (Field, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 370 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan argued that the Court had
jurisdiction to decide the Eighth Amendment claim even though it was not in the
assignments of error. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan reasoned that "[the]
punishment ... in view of the character of the offenses committed, must be deemed
both cruel and unusual." Id. at 371 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
47. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
48. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286-87 (1983). But see Harmelin v. Michigan,
111 S. Ct. 2680, 2682 (1991) ("[I]t is hard to view Weems as announcing a constitu-
tional proportionality requirement given that it did not produce a decision implement-
ing such a requirement ... for six decades.").
49. Weemns, 217 U.S. at 365.
50. Id. at 367.
51. Id. at 357.
52. Id. at 384.
il disabilities attached and remained throughout the offender's life-
time.' The Court held that the offense did not warrant the imposition
of a disproportionately severe punishment, and observed that the
Eighth Amendment proscribed legislative action in this area." The
Court applied a comparative test to determine that the sentence was
out of proportion with the crime; it examined the nature of the crime,
compared the penalty with penalties in other jurisdictions for the same
offense, and considered penalties for more serious crimes within the
same jurisdiction.'
B. Trop v. Dulles
The decision in Weems failed, however, to immediately establish pro-
portionality as a component of the Eighth Amendment, perhaps because
of its unusual facts. The next significant Eighth Amendment case was
decided almost fifty years later and also involved somewhat odd facts.
In Trop v. Du//es, the petitioner lost his United States citizenship af-
ter being court-martialed for wartime desertion. 7 Although there was
no evidence presented that the petitioner declared his allegiance to a
53. Id. These "civil disabilities" included (1) civil interdiction by depriving the per-
son of parental authority, guardianship of person or property, participation in family
council, marital authority, and the right to dispose of personal property by inter vivos
gift; (2) perpetual absolute disqualification by depriving the person of office, the right
to vote, the right to be elected to office, acquisition of honors, and retirement pay;
and (3) subjection to surveillance during life by imposing on the person the duty to
fix his domicile and to request permission from the proper authorities to change it,
to observe rules of inspection, and to adopt some trade, art, industry, or profession if
he did not have some other means of supporting himself. Id. at 364-65.
54. Id. at 378-79.
55. Id. at 377-81. The Court compared Weems' crime of falsifying a single item of
a public record to other serious crimes and found that many resulted in a less
severe punishment. These crimes included robbery, larceny, incitement of rebellion,
conspiracy to destroy the government by force, and forgery of bonds and other instru-
ments for the purpose of defrauding the United States. Id, at 380. The Court also
found that the law in the Philippines punished counterfeiting "the obligations or
securities of the United States or of the Philippine Islands" less severely than Weems'
crime. Id. at 380-81. The contrast forced the Court to conclude that the severity of
the sentence imposed on Weems was cruel and unusual. Id. at 382.
Seventy-three years later, the Court in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) took
a similar approach and held that sentences reviewed under the Eighth Amendment
should be guided by three objective factors. Id. at 290. First, the court conducting
the review should compare the gravity of the offense to the severity of the punish-
ment. Second, it should compare the sentence imposed to other sentences imposed
for other crimes in that jurisdiction. Third, it should compare the sentence imposed
to other sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id. at 290-92.
56. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 87.
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foreign power,' the Court concluded that denaturalization was not
excessive when compared to the offense of wartime desertion, a capital
crime.' However, the Court posited that "the existence of the death
penalty [was] not a license to the Government to devise any punish-
ment short of death within the limit of its imagination."' Though the
meaning of the phrase "cruel and unusual" was far from certain, the
Court stated that the Eighth Amendment must be interpreted in light of
"the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society.""' Thus, the Court ruled that the destruction of the person
as a political entity, coupled with the rarity of denaturalization, made
the penalty "cruel and unusual."'
C. Robinson v. California
Four years later, the Court expanded upon the proportionality princi-
ple first announced in Weems. In Robinson v. California,' the peti-
tioner received a sentence of ninety days imprisonment under a Califor-
nia statute making drug addiction a misdemeanor." Since the statute re-
quired neither criminal intent nor the commission of an overt act,' the
58. Id. at 92.
59. ld. at 99. By negative implication, the Court recognized that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits disproportionate penalties. See Schwartz, supra note 24, at 387.
60. Trp, 356 U.S. at 99.
61. Id. at 100-01.
62. Id. at 100-02. The Court also noted that of 84 nations surveyed, only Turkey
and the Philippines imposed denaturalization for desertion. Id. at 103.
63. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
64. Id. at 663. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1962) (making it a
crime to be "addicted to narcotics"). Justice Stewart noted that the statute prohibited
a person from either using narcotics or being addicted to narcotics. Robinson, 370
U.S. at 662. He determined that the section making "use" of narcotics illegal was
based upon the "act" of taking the drug, and that the section directed at being "ad-
dicted to the use of narcotics" was based upon a "condition or status." Id. The
petitioner could have been convicted based upon either portion of the statute. Id. at
665.
65. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666. Justice Stewart described the statute as
not one which punishes a person for the use of narcotics, for their purchase,
sale or possession, or for antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from
their administration ... [the statute] makes the "status" of narcotic addiction
a criminal offense, for which the offender may be prosecuted "at any time
before he reforms." California has said that a person can be continuously
guilty of this offense, whether or not he has ever used or possessed any nar-
cotics within the state, and whether or not he has been guilty of any antiso-
Court held that the sentence of imprisonment for such an "offense" was
cruel and unusual punishment, much in the same manner that "one day
in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of
having a common cold.' In so doing, the Court for the first time ex-
tended the protection of the Eighth Amendment to the States via the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Robinson rein-
forced the idea that "the punishment must fit the crime" by emphasizing
that the imposition of a penalty must be proportionate to the offender's
moral culpability.*
D. Death Penalty Cases
The proportionality principle of the Eighth Amendment has seen its
most thorough development in capital punishment cases. In 1971, the
Supreme Court held, in a brief per curiam opinion in Furman v. Geor-
gia,' that capital punishment violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. However, the Court found no unifying rationale. Nine




66. l& at 667. The Court held that as a matter of criminal law, a state cannot
punish the "status" of narcotics addiction. Id.
67. 1l at 6686.
68. 1L at 666-67. The Court likened criminalizing addiction to making -it illegal to
be afflicted with mental illness, leprosy, or a venereal disease. Id. at 666. Such an
affliction can be acquired "innocently or involuntarily." IL at 667. Thus, punishing a
person suffering from addiction or illness, even though he has committed no overt
criminal act, violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Ld. Justice Douglas
noted in a concurring opinion that "[a] punishment out of all proportion to the
offense may bring it within the ban against 'cruel and unusual punishments.'" Id. at
676 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331 (1892)).
Justice Douglas stated that this same principle prohibited punishing a person for
having an illness. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice White objected to this novel
use of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and argued that it was for the
legislative branch to decide upon the best approach to deal with traffic in illegal
drugs. Id. at 689 (White, J., dissenting). Robinson'did not, however, forbid punishing
any crime caused by illness. In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the Court
upheld a conviction for public intoxication and distinguished it from chronic alcohol-
lm. Id. at 532-33. See Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the
Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L REv. 635, 654 (1966) (speculating that Robin-
son could create a revolution in criminal law).
69. 408 U.S. 238, 23940 (1972) (per curiam).
70. 1l at 23940.
71. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall filed separate concur-
ring opinions. See id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that the irregular and
selective application of the death penalty violates both the Eighth and Fourteenth
[VoL 20- 747, 1993] Harmelin v. Michigan
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In Furman, the trial court convicted the petitioner of murder and
sentenced him to death under Georgia law.' In two companion cas-
es," the trial courts convicted the petitioners'4 of rape and imposed
capital sentences under Georgia and Texas law respectively.'
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion stated that a principle innate in
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was "that a severe punish-
ment must not be excessive." ' He adopted as a guiding principle the
belief that sentences must comport with basic human dignity, and that
inflicting a punishment that was unnecessarily severe violated that pre-
cept." Justice Brennan noted that death, like imprisonment, was a "tra-
ditional" punishment.m This did not serve, however, to make the death
penalty immune to Eighth Amendment proscription.'
Amendments); id. at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the Cruel and Un-
usual Punishments Clause operates as a constitutional check on the legislature, pre-
venting it from arbitrarily inflicting severe punishments); id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (reaching the narrower conclusion that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
"this unique penalty (from being) so wantonly and so freakishly imposed"); i&L at 310-
14 (White, J., concurring) (finding the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional,
but is only forbidden when imposed by the jury's unguided discretion); id. at 314-74
(Marshall, .J., concurring) (believing that capital punishment is an unconstitutionally
excessive penalty and is morally unacceptable to the citizens of the United States).
Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist filed separate dissents. See id.
at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the Eighth Amendment does not apply
to the manner in which a particular punishment is imposed, but only forbids certain
types of punishment); id. at 405-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that It is
beyond the power of the Supreme Court to strike down a legislatively mandated
penalty); id. at 414-65 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that according to the principles
of judicial restraint, the abolition or imposition of capital punishment must be left to
the discretion of the legislative branch); id. at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(finding that judicial restraint is an implied condition of the Supreme Court's power
of judicial review and that the Court violated that condition in striking down a
penalty proscribed by the legislature).
72. 1& at 239.
73. The two companion cases were Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Taras. Id.
at 238 n.1.
74. Id. at 239. All three petitioners were black males. See generally Fredric J.
Bendremer et al., Comment, McClesky v. Kemp: Constitutionai Tolerance for Racially
Disparate Capital Sentencing, 41 U. MiAI L RE V. 295 (1986) (arguing that the
racially disparate impact of the death penalty on African-American males violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
75. %urman, 408 U.S. at 239.
76. Id, at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 280-81 (Brennan, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 282 (Brennan, J., concurring).
79. 1d. at 282-84 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall also recognized the proportionality component of the
Eighth Amendment in his concurring opinion.' He reasoned that a pen-
alty might be cruel and unusual if it is excessive or unnecessary."' He
cited the dissent in O'Neil and the majority opinions in Weems, Trop,
and Robinson as a line of authority prohibiting excessive punish-
ments.
The Furman Court found that the unrestricted application of the
death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment.' The Court
essentially remanded the death penalty question to the states, requiring
each state to re-enact its respective capital punishment statutes so as to
be consistent with the Furman decision." Many states soon enacted
statutes to correct the prior defects.' This prompted a plurality of the
Court in Gregg v. Georgia" to hold that the death penalty did not vio-
late the Eighth Amendment under all circumstances.' In so doing,
however, the plurality recognized that the "punishment must not be
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime."' On that same
day, the Court decided four other capital cases in Woodson v. North
Carolina.' These cases established the principle that the standardless,
mandatory imposition of the death penalty was unconstitutional.' Sys-
80. Id. at 331 (Marshall, J., concurring).
81. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 331-32 (Marshall, J., concurring). See supra notes 36-68 and accompany-
ing text.
83. See Albert W. Alschuler, Burger's Failure: Trying Too Much to Lead, NAT'L
LJ., Feb. 18, 1980, at 27 n.4.
84. Id.
85. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). At the time Gregg was decided, 35
states had enacted new statutes imposing the death penalty that addressed the de-
fects found in Furman by (1) providing guidelines to juries and trial courts regarding
the imposition of capital punishment, or (2) making the death penalty mandatory for
certain crimes. Id. at 179 & n.22-24 (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., concurring).
86. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
87. Id. at 187. The plurality in Gregg found that the death penalty was not always
disproportionate to the crime of murder. Id. (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., con-
curring).
88. Ld. at 173 (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., concurring).
89. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
90. Id. at 302-03. The North Carolina statute imposing a mandatory death penalty
for first degree murder was an inadequate response to Furman because the statute
took from the jury aU sentencing power instead of providing standards for imposing
a capital sentence. Id.
The other cases decided were Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). In Roberts,
the Court found Lousiana's statute unconstitutional because it imposed a mandatory
death penalty even though the first degree murder definition was narrower in scope
than the statute at Issue in Woodson. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331-34. In Profitt, the
Court ruled that Florida's procedure requiring the trial judge to weigh aggravating and
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tems that provided guidance for juries in imposing capital punishment
along with various procedural protections for defendants were up-
held."1
In 1977, the Court again discussed proportionality as an element of
the Eighth Amendment in Coker v. Georgia." In Coker, the trial court
convicted the defendant of armed robbery, kidnapping, and rape.' The
juryconsidered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances according
to the dictates of Furman and Gregg, and sentenced Coker to death by
electrocution." The Court held that the punishment was disproportion-
ate to the crime of rape and, thus, prohibited by the Eighth Amend-
ment.
6
In reaching this result, the Court compared the Georgia law to the
laws of other states and found that only Georgia authorized the death
penalty for the rape of an adult woman." While recognizing the seri-
ousness of the defendant's crime, the Court reasoned that the finality of
a death sentence made it "an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as
such, does not take a human life."'
In Enmund v. Florida," the Court extended this reasoning to the
mitigating factors in determining whether to impose the death penalty was a constitu-
tionally acceptable response to Furman. Profitt, 428 U.S. at 253. In Jurek, the Court
approved a Texas statute requiring the jury to consider mitigating and aggravating
factors before imposing the death penalty, thus eliminating the problems of arbitrary
sentencing encountered in Furman. Jurek, 428 U.S. 271-73.
91. See Virginia Gayle Morrow, Criminal Procedure-North Carolina's Capital Sen-
tencing Procedure: The Struggle for* an Acceptable Jury Instruction, 62 N.C.L. REv.
833, 836 (1984) (noting that the North Carolina Legislature responded to Woodson by
passing a statute that required the jury to balance aggravating and mitigating factors
before imposing the death penalty). See also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). See
generally Rush, supra note 23.
92. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
93. Id. at 587.
94. Id. at 591.
95. Id. at 592. The plurality refised to consider Coker's prior crimes because he
was sentenced to death on only the rape charge. Id. at 599.
96. Id. at 594-96. Two other jurisdictions authorized the death penalty for the rape
of a child. Id. at 596. Justice White also surveyed the Georgia court system and
found that Georgia imposed the death penalty in only 6 of the 63 rape cases re-
viewed by the Georgia Supreme Court. Id, at 596-97.
97. Id. at 597-98. Justice White considered existing community standards in deter-
mining that capital punishment was a disproportionate penalty for the crime of rape.
Georgia was the sole jurisdiction that made rape a capital offense, and Georgia juries
had shown reluctance in imposing the death penalty for rape. Id. at 596-98.
98. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
crime of felony-murder. The petitioner in Enmund had participated in a
robbery in which one of his accomplices had killed two people.' The
State did not prove that Enmund was present at the killings, nor that he
had intent to kill.' Under Florida's felony-murder rule, however, the
jury convicted him of first degree murder and sentenced him to
death."0 ' The Court noted that only eight of the thirty-six jurisdictions
authorizing the death penalty considered felony-murder a crime punish-
able by death.' In this case, as in Coker before it, the Court rejected
capital punishment as an appropriate penalty for a crime less than mur-
der.'°M In relation to Enmund's culpability, the Court found the death
penalty "unconstitutionally excessive.""
E. Application of the Proportionality Principle Developed in Death
Penalty Cases to Sentences of Imprisonment
The proportionality principle set forth in the Court's death penalty
cases did not necessarily extend to cases involving terms of imprison-
ment. Certain courts continued to hold that a term of years within stat-
utory limits did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment." Other
99. Id. at 784.
100. Id- at 785.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 792. Justice White found that while current legislative judgment was not
"wholly unanimous" among states with regard to imposing the death penalty for
crimes less than murder, it "weigh[ed] on the side of rejecting capital punishment for
this crime at issue." Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596-99 (1977).
103. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797. See Douglas W. Schwartz, Note, Imposing the Death
Sentence for Felony-Murder on a Non-Triggerman, 37 STAN. L REV. 857 (1985) (pro-
posing that, at a minimum, Enmund requires a finding of knowledge on the part of a
nontriggerman before a capital sentence may be imposed).
104. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800. Justice White found that the death penalty, "'unique
in its severity and irrevocability,'" was an excessive penalty for a robber who did not
take a human life. Id. at 797 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187).
105. See Marcella v. United States, 344 F.2d 876, 882 (9th Cir. 1965) (stating that a
40-year sentence for five counts of narcotics violations is not cruel and unusual punish-
ment), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1016 (1966); Anthony v. United States, 331 F.2d 687, 693
(9th Cir. 1964) (holding that 40 years' days imprisonment for two sales of marijuana
is a customary punishment and cannot be characterized as "cruel" or "unusual");
Lindsey v. United States, 332 F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 1964) (declaring that a sentence
of five years each on six counts of fraud by wire was within statutory limits); State
v. McNally, 211 A.2d 162, 164 (Conn.) (holding that consecutive life -sentences for two
counts of second degree murder are not cruel and unusual if imposed within estab-
lished statutory limits), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 948 (1965); Chavigny v. State, 112 So.2d
910, 915 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibition refers
to the statute authorizing the sentence and not the sentence fixed within the statute's
limits, and that therefore consecutive life sentences for two counts of second degree
murder are not cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 114 So. 2d 6 (Fla 1959),
and cert. denied, 362 U.S. 922 (1960).
760,
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courts begrudgingly acknowledged a narrow proportionality principle,
but only under "extraordinary and special circumstances."'
Still other courts, however, applied the reasoning of Coker and Gregg
to sentences of imprisonment." For example, one court found that a
sentence of thirty to sixty years for possession of a small amount of
marijuana violated the Eighth Amendment due to the punishment's
severity in relation to the crime." Successful challenges to terms of
imprisonment on proportionality grounds, however, remained rare.
F. The Tension Between Rummel v. Estelle and Solem v. Helm: Who
Decides What Is "Proportionate?"
1. Rummel v. Estelle
In the 1980 decision of Rummel v. Estelle,"° the Supreme Court re-
treated from its past decisions that incorporated a proportionality guar-
antee in the Eighth Amendment. The Court felt that it was the duty of
the legislature, not the judiciary, to set criminal penalties.' Only in
the most extreme cases, the Court reasoned, should federal courts in-
tercede on a defendant's behalf to reduce the sentence received."'
106. Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226, 1232 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v.
Wooten, 503 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding that consecutive 20-year terms and a
$20,000 fine for possession with intent to distribute, and distribution of, marijuana is
cruel and unusual punishment)); see also Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 409 (2d
Cir. 1978) (holding that a severe sentence imposed for a minor offense could violate
the Eighth Amendment's dictate against cruel and unusual punishment solely on
account of its length), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979); Boerngen v. United States,
326 F.2d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1964) (holding that consecutive ten-year terms for two
counts of transporting forged documents were not so disproportionate as to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment).
107. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that unrea-
sonable punishments that are grossly disproportionate to the offense charged consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment), ofjd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); United States v.
Corbin Farm Ser., 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Ca.) (per curiam) (adopting proposition
that an excessive prison sentence could constitute cruel and unusual punishment if
grossly out of proportion to the crime), offd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
108. Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S.
993.
109. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
110. Id. at 274.
111. Id. at 274 n.11 (citing the dissent's example of life imprisonment for overtime
parking). The Court gave no indication of how to determine when the proportionality
principle should apply. Id. at 307 n.25 (Powell, J., dissenting).
In Rummel, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced under a Tex-
as repeat offender statute that imposed life imprisonment upon an indi-
vidual convicted of a third felony."2 Under the Texas system of "good
time" credits, however, Rummel could be eligible for parole in as few as
ten years."' Rummel's prior convictions were for fraudulent use of a
credit card"4 and for passing a forged check for $28.36." His most
recent offense involved obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses."' The
Court ruled that a life sentence for theft of approximately $230 was not
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment."' The
Court reasoned that the proportionality test used in death penalty cases
was of "limited assistance" in Rummel's case because the nature of a
death sentence is "qualitatively different" from a sentence of life impris-
onment."8 The Court also distinguished Weems' peculiar facts,"" and
argued that "the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a
matter of legislative prerogative. " "
112. ld. at 266. Recidivist statutes were found constitutional by the United States
Supreme Court in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). In Rummel, the petitioner
only attacked the application of the statute to the facts of his case. Rummel, 445
U.S. at 268.
113. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 293 (Powell, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 265. Rummel was convicted of using the credit card to obtain $80 worth
of goods or services. Since the amount exceeded $50, he was charged with a felony
punishable by two to ten years in prison. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id, at 266.
117. Id, at 285. See generally Patricia E. Rant, Note, Criminal Lau-Cruel and
Unusual Punishment-Mandatory Life Imprisonment Under Texas Recividist Statute
Not Violative of Eighth Amendment When Applied to One Convicted of Three Non-
Violent Property.Related Felonies-Rummel v. Estelle, 12 ST. MARY's LJ. 525 (1980)
(viewing Rummet as a retreat from the "evolving standards of decency" enunciated in
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), and a limit on future Eighth Amendment
challenges to punishments differing in kind, rather than degree, from traditional
sentences). If Rummel is used as a yardstick, Harmelin's sentence of life without
possibility of parole for possession of cocaine does not seem as severe in compari-
son. See infra notes 150-56.
118. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272. Justice Powell objected to the majority's use of the
distinction between capital and noncapital sentences in limiting an Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis. Id. at 306 (Powell, J., dissenting). He quoted Justice Frank-
furter in stating, "'[The fact that a line has to be drawn somewhere does not justify
its being drawn anywhere.'" Id. (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Pearce v. Commis-
sioner, 315 U.S. 543, 558 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). In Justice Powell's view,
the majority chose "the easiest line rather than the best." Id. at 307 (Powell, J.,
dissenting.).
119. Id. at 273-74. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text. See also Pressly
Millen, Note, Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment-Rummel, Solem, and the Venera-
ble Case of Weems v. United States, 1984 DuKE L4. 789 (arguing that the rationale
applied in Weems, rather than that of either Rummel or Sotem, best preserves the
intent of the framers In Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
120. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274. But see Thomas F. Cavalier, Note, Salvaging Propor-
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2. Hutto v. Davis
The Supreme Court followed the reasoning set forth in Rummel in its
1982 memorandum opinion for 'Hutto v. Davis.121 In Hutto, the peti-
tioner was convicted of possession and distribution of small amounts of
marijuana and sentenced to forty years in prison and $20,000 in
fines.' The Court rejected the application of the proportionality prin-
ciple in this case, maintaining that Rummel prevented its application to
cases involving "excessive" imprisonment.n
3. Solem v. Helm
The following year the Court granted certiorari on a case with facts
very similar to those presented in Rummel. The petitioner in Solem v.
Helm'" was sentenced to life in prison under a South Dakota recidi-
vist statute.'" Unlike the petitioner in Rummel, however, the petition-
er here did not retain the possibility of parole."5 The felony offense at
issue in Solem was the issuance of a "no account" check for $100 .2"
Because Helm had six previous felony convictions, the trial court sen-
tenced him under South Dakota's repeat offender statute.'" The Court,
while noting that it had never applied proportionality principles to a
term of imprisonment, expressly expanded the proportionality analysis
by holding that "as a matter of principle... a criminal sentence must
be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been con-
tionate Prison Sentencing: A Reply to Rummel v. Estelle, 15 U. MICH. J.L REF. 285
(1982) (rejecting Rummel's assertion that there is no precedent for a proportionality
review of prison sentences and proposing that state courts adopt a proportionality
analysis under their state constitutions).
121. 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
122. Id. at 371.
123. Ld. at 373. See generally Anita Eve, Note, Constitutional Law-A 40-Year
Sentence of Imprisonment Within the Limits of a Statute Does Not Amount to Cruei
and Unusual Punishment: Hutto v. Davis, 26 How. LJ. 305 (1983) (asserting that
allowing legislatures to define proportionality abdicates judicial responsibility and is
contrary to the admonishment in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), to interpret
the Eighth Amendment in light of "evolving standards of decency").
124. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
125. Id. at 281.
126. Id. Sew Rummel v. Estele, 445 U.S. 263, 293 (1980).
127. Slem, 463 U.S. at 281.
128. Id. at 279-81. Helm's prior convictions included burglary, third offense drunk driv-
ing, grand larceny, and obtaining money by false pretenses. Id.
victed." "=
So/em did not expressly overrule Rummel; in fact, it strained to dis-
tinguish the two cases factually."n The Solem Court focused on the
possibility that Rummel would be eligible for parole in as few as ten
years, whereas Helm could never qualify for parole.3 ' The Court
stressed that Solem did not pave the way for appellate review of all
sentences; indeed, it envisioned that such appeals would be "'exceeding-
ly rare."M13
The Solem Court set out three objective factors that courts should
apply in an Eighth Amendment analysis. First, courts should examine
the underlying offense and the severity of the penalty."i Second,
courts should compare the sentence received to those imposed for
more serious crimes in the same jurisdiction."l Third, courts should
compare the sentence received to that imposed for the same crime in
other jurisdictions." In applying these factors to the case at hand, the
Court noted that Helm received the harshest penalty possible under
South Dakota law,"3 while his underlying offenses were relatively mi-
nor and nonviolent."n
129. ld. at 290. See generally Barton C. Legum, Note, 'Doum the Road Toward
Human Decency:" Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and Solem v. Helm,
18 GA. L REv. 109 (1983) (finding that Solem was more consistent with the history
of the Eighth Amendment than Rummel in rejecting the proposition that prison
sentences are purely a matter of legislative prerogative); Maja Campbell-Eaton, Note,
Solem v. Helm: Extension of Eighth Amendment Proportionality Review to
Noncapital Punishment, 69 IOWA L REv. 775 (1984) (arguing that Solem was a natu-
ral extension of prior precedents). The Court noted that although prison sentences
will seldom be overturned because they are disproportionately severe, that does not
obviate the need for an Eighth Amendment analysis in noncapital cases. Solem, 463
U.S. at 289. Though courts should defer to the broad discretion of legislatures in set-
ting criminal penalties, "no penalty is per se constitutional." Id. at 290.
130. Solem, 463 U.S. at 297, 300-03. See Keir, supra note 23, at 509-10; see also
Johnathan C. Aked, Note, Solem v. Helm: The Supreme Court Extends the Propor-
tionality Requirement to Sentences of Imprisonment, 1984 Wis. L REv. 1401, 1423 &
nn.14647 (emphasizing the lack of possibility for parole as the distinguishing factor in
Solem); Campbell-Eaton, supra note 129, at 793 (citing the mandatory nature of
Helm's sentence as the key factor distinguishing Solem from Rummel).
131. Solem, 463 U.S. at 297. Helm would, however, still be eligible for legislative or
executive clemency. Id. at 283.
132. ld at 289-90 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)).
133. Id. at 290-91.
134. Id. at 291.
135. Id.
136. ld. at 297. There is no death penalty in South Dakota. Id. The Court also
noted that ."Helm was treated more severely than he would have been in any other
state." Id. at 300.
137. Id. at 297.
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H. HARMELIN v. MICHIGAN
Ronald Harmelin relied on Solem for the proposition that sentences
of imprisonment must be proportionate to the crime charged."
Harmelin argued that, although serious, his crime did not involve death
or violence; therefore, it was, cruel and unusual punishment to inflict
the same sentence on him as on a convicted murderer. Unfortunately
for Harmelin, the United States Supreme Court refused to find the dis-
tinction significant under the Eighth Amendment.
A. Facts,
At approximately 2:45 A.M. on May 12, 1986, Officers Rix and
Blakeney of the Oak Park, Michigan Police Department drove into the
parking lot of the Embassy Motel."= At this time and twice later that
morning, the officers observed Harmelin's car entering and leaving the
lot." Other than these early morning comings and goings, nothing
about Harmelin's activities attracted the officers' attention.'
Shortly after observing the petitioner's car exit the lot a third time,
the officers again encountered his car. This time they watched the peti-
tioner run. a red light while making a U-turn at an intersection. The of-
ficers stopped Harmelin, who remained seated in his car and cooperat-
ed with the officers when asked for his license and registration.
Harmelin eventually stepped out of his car."
He immediately told the officers that he was carrying a gun in his
ankle holster." Not wishing to alarm the officers, he explained that
he had a permit to carry the concealed weapon. He handed the permits
for the .38-caliber, five-chamber revolver to Officer Rix, who then con-
138. Brief of Petitioner, Harmelin v. Michigan 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (No. 89-7272),
available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs File.
139. People v. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Mich. Ct App. 1989), appeal denied,
434 Mich. 863 (1990), qLrd, 111 S. Ct. 2860 (1991). In the past, the motel lot had
proved a popular spot for dumping stolen vehicles. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. At no time did the officers observe anything unusual or illegal about the
petitioner's car or the manner in which he drove. Id.
142. Id. There was some dispute as to whether the officers ordered Harmelin out
of the car or whether he got out on his own. Id.
143. Id.
fiscated the gun.'" Because the petitioner appeared nervous, and one
of Harmelin's coat pockets had a bulge, the officer decided to conduct
a pat-down search. The search yielded marijuana, and the petitioner
was placed under arrest.'"
A more thorough search pursuant to the arrest revealed additional
contraband.'" Harmelin's car was impounded and an inventory search
was conducted."7 A shaving bag in the trunk contained $2900 in cash
and two bags of white powder. Later tests revealed that the white pow-
der was 672.5 grams of cocaine.'" Additionally, the petitioner's finger-
prints were found on books inside the shaving bag and next to the
packets of cocaine."'
B. Procedural Background
At trial, Ronald Harmelin was convicted of possession of 672.5 grams
of cocaine and sentenced under Michigan law to life in prison without
possibility of parole.'" On appeal, the court ruled that the search was
illegal and reversed Harmelin's conviction. ' The dissenting judge ar-
gued that the record was unclear as to whether the petitioner was or-
dered out of the car or got out voluntarily.'" Two months later, the
court vacated this judgment on its own motion and reconsidered the
case.'" Upon further review, the court concluded that its initial ruling
was in error and reinstated the conviction.'" The Michigan Supreme
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. The search revealed "assorted pills and capsules, three vials of white powder,
ten baggles of white powder, drug paraphernalia and a telephone beeper." Id.
147. Id. at 77-78.
148. Id. at 78. Michigan classifies cocaine as a controlled substance. MICH. COMP.
LAW ANN. § 333.7214(a)(iv) (West 1992). According to Justice Kennedy, this amount
of pure cocaine can potentially produce between 32,500 and 65,000 doses. Harmelin
v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2705 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing A.
WASHTON, COCAINE ADDICTION: TREATMENT, RECOVERY, AND RELAPSE PREVENTION 18
(1989)). Authorities estimated the street value to be $100,000. David G. Savage, Jus-
tices Uphold Victims' Rights, 'Cuel' Punishments, LA. TIMES, June 28, 1991, at Al.
149. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d at 78. At trial, defense counsel called no witnesses. In-
stead, Harmelin's attorney attacked the admissibility of the offered evidence. Id.
150. Id. at 7-77. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.7403 (2)(a)(i) (West 1992).
151. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d at 76. The court interpreted the search-and-seizure
provision under the Michigan Constitution as more protective than the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Minms, 434 U.S. 106, 111
(1977) (per curtam) (holding that it is constitutional for a police officer to orderan
individual out of his or her car during a routine traffic stop).
152. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d at 76.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 80. The court ruled that the Michigan Constitution provided greater pro-
tection than the federal constitution only within the curtilage of a dwelling house. See
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Court denied appeal. M In 1990, the United States Supreme Court grant-
ed the petitioner's writ of certiorari."
IV. ANALYSIS OF HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
Reflecting the unsettled nature of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, especially regarding the proportionality component, the Court in
Harmelin v. Michigan67 fragmented into five opinions. This Comment
focuses on the three main opinions. First, the Comment examines Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion, followed by Justice Kennedy's concurrence, and,
lastly, Justice White's dissenting opinion."
A. Justice Scalia's Opinion
Justice Scalia's opinion consisted of five parts. The majority only
joined Part V.W ' In Parts I-IV of his opinion, Justice Scalia was joined
only by the Chief Justice.
1. Rejection of Solem v. Helm and Its Interpretation of the Original
Intent of the Phrase "Cruel and Unusual Punishments"
MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 11. Since the officers stopped Harmelin on a public road, he
was entitled only to minimum constitutional protection. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d at 78.
Thus, the police had the authority to order the petitioner out of his car and to con-
duct a pat-down search. In so ruling, the court rejected Harmelin's contention that
his mandatory sentence to life in prison without possibility of parole violated the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
155. People v. Harmelin, 434 MIch. 863, cert. granted, 495 U.S. 956 (1990), affd, 111
S. Ct 2680 (1991).
156. Harmelin v. MIchigan, 495 U.S. 956 (1990), of'd, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). The
Supreme Court affirmed Harmelin's sentence. Harmelin v. Mchigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680
(1991). Eventually, Harmelin appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court on the ground
that his sentence violated the Michigan State Constitution. People v. Bullock 485
N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992). The Mchigan Supreme Court held that a mandatory sen-
tence of liWe in prison without possibility of parole for possession of 650 or more
grams of cocaine constituted cruel or unusual punishment under the state constitu-
tion. Id. at 877. See infra note 350 and accompanying text.
157. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
158. The dissenting opinions of Justices Marshall and Stevens are addressed briefly
at infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
159. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter joined
Justice Scalia in holding that Harmelin's sentence did not violate the Eighth
Amendment despite the state court's refusal to consider the individual, mitigating
circumstances. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2701-02.
Justice Scalia began his analysis with the proposition that Solem v.
Helm'" wrongly concludes that the Eighth Amendment contained a
proportionality component. " ' The Court in Solem recognized that the
meaning of the phrase "cruel and unusual" was uncertain, but stated
that "it at least incorporated 'the longstanding principle of English law
that the punishment... should not be, by reason of its excessive length
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged.'"" Accord-
ing to Solem, when the framers incorporated the language of the Eng-
lish Bill of Rights' into the Eighth Amendment, they meant to guaran-
tee American citizens all of the rights enjoyed by British subjects.'"
Therefore, the British interpretation of the phrase "cruel and unusual"
becomes pertinent to American Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Under Justice Scalia's analysis, however, the English Bill of Rights
prohibited "illegal," not "disproportionate," penalties.' Justice Scalia
contended that if the English framers had meant to'prohibit "dispropor-
tionate" or "excessive" punishments, they would have said so.' Under
Justice Scalla's reasoning, an excessive penalty can be considered "cru-
el" but not necessarily "unusual," thereby circumventing the prohibi-
tion."" In arriving at this conclusion, Justice Scalia agreed with
Granucci and other modem historians who allege that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause was not a response to the "Bloody Assiz-
es," but to the perjury trial of Titus Oates." Thus, the clause prohibits
arbitrary penalties that are not authorized by either the common law or
statute.' Only in these circumstances would Justice Scalia find an im-
posed sentence "cruel and unusual": not that it is excessive, but that it
is beyond the judge's authority under the law.'"0 Justice Scalia further
supported his theory by proposing that the word "illegal" was used
interchangeably with the word "unusual" at that time.'
160. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
161. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2686.
162. SoIem, 463 U.S. at 285 (quoting RICHARD L PERRY, THE SOURCES OF OUR LIBER-
TIES 236 (1959)).
163. The English Bill of Rights provides that "excessive Baile ought not to be
required nor excessive Fines imposed nor crueli and unusuall Punishments inflicted."
1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689) (Eng.). See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying
text.
164. Solem, 463 U.S. at 286.
165. Harmelin, 111 S. CL at 2690.
166. 1d. at 2687.
167. Id.
168. See supra note 27-29 and accompanying text.
169. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2688.
170. Id. at 2690-91.
171. Id. Justice Scalia left open the question of whether a punishment could be out-
side the lawful authority of the judge (i.e. "illegal" or "unusual") and at the same
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Despite Justice Scalia's analysis of English jurisprudence, he argued
that the "ultimate question" is what the framers of the American Bill of
Rights intended by the phrase "cruel and unusual."' However, the
sparse legislative history that accompanied the adoption of the Eighth
Amendment makes this task difficult.
Justice Scalia began his analysis in the same way he began his analy-
sis of the English Bill of Rights: If the Eighth Amendment was meant to
prohibit disproportionate penalties, it would do so explicitly. 4 After
all, he reasoned that "proportionality provisions had been [explicitly]
included in several state constitutions."" He rejected the contention
that the framers thought that the term "cruel and unusual" implicitly
guaranteed proportional punishments. 76 From the little legislative his-
tory that does exist and according to many commentators,' the
Eighth Amendment was interpreted as prohibiting only certain modes
of punishment.'" Early state court interpretations of the Eighth Amend-
ment bear out this construction. 7 9
time fail to be "crueL" Granucci pointed out that the framers of the English Bill of
Rights explicitly prohibited "disproportionate" punishments by using the phrase "cruel
and unusuaL" Granucci, supra note 25, at 865. However, Justice Scalia relied on the
modem usage of the word "cruel" in his analysis as meaning "merciless, pitiless, [or]
hard-hearted." See 2 OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 1216 (1970). Absent a penalty that
fits within this definition of "cruel," Justice Scalia may find no violation of the Eighth
Amendment In the late 17th century, however, the word "cruel" was synonymous
with "severe." Thus, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause may indeed contain a
prohibition against severe or excessive penalties within the meaning of the words
themselves. Granucci, supra note 25, at 860.
172. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2691.
173. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
174. Harnelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2692.
175. ld. For example, the Constitutions of Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and New
Hampshire enacted in 1776, 1778 and 1784 respectively, all guaranteed that punish-
ments shall be proportionate to the crime. Id (citing PA. CONST. § 38; S.C. CONST.
art. XL; N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS pt. 1, art. XVIID.
176. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
177. See Granucci, supra note 25, at 839.43.
178. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text
179. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2695-96 (citing Territory v. Ketchum, 65 P. 169, 171
(N.M. 1901) (stating that a sentence so disproportionate as to shock the conscience
would be "cruel and unusual" punishment); State v. Hogan, 58 N.E. 572, 575 (Ohio
1900) (finding that punishment may be severe, but it is the legislature's duty to
determine appropriate sentences); Hobbs v. State, 32 N.E. 1019, 1020-21 (Ind. 1893)
(same); State v. Becker, 51 N.W. 1018, 1022 (S.D. 1892) (invoking the power of the
courts under the South Dakota Constitution to intervene where the punishment is so
disproportionate so as to shock the public conscience); People v. Morris, 45 N.W.
2. Critical Analysis of the Factors Set Forth in Solem v. Helm
In Justice Scalia's view, prohibiting certain methods of punishment
rather than "disproportionate" penalties makes good judicial sense.'1
It is relatively easy for judges to determine whether or not a particular
mode of punishment is "torturous or barbaric."' Proportionality, on
the other hand, is a more subjective analysis that is best left to the
legislature.-
As proof of this proposition, Justice Scalia analyzed the three factors
set forth in Solem v. Helm: (1) the gravity of the offense as compared
to the harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on similarly
offensive crimes in the same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences im-
posed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."
591, 692 (Mich. 1890) (finding that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause refers
to the kind of punishment and not the degree); State v. White, 25 P. 33, 34-35 (Kan.
1890) (reasoning that imprisonment at hard labor is not a cruel and unusual punish-
ment because it was a common penalty throughout the state's existence); State v.
Williams, 77 Mo. 310, 312-13 (Mo. 1883) (finding that the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause forbids torture or barbarous penalties, but does not apply to the propor-
tionality of prison sentences); Cummins v. People, 3 N.W. 305, 305 (Mich. 1879)
(holding that a sentence imposed within the statutory limits is not cruel and unusual
punishment); Whitten v. Georgia, 47 Ga. 297, 301 (1872) (stating that the Constitution
limits infliction of torturous or barbarous punishments, but a punishment's severity is
otherwise at the discretion of the legislature); Garcia v. Territory, 1 N.M. 415, 417-19
(1869) (reasoning that whipping is not a cruel and unusual punishment because it has
long been a common punishment and it does not amount to torture); Commonwealth
v. Hitchings, 71 Mass. (1 Gray) 482, 486 (1855) (stating that the legislature determines
the severity of punishments); Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 447
(1824) (holding that the Eighth Amendment applies only to certain modes of punish-
ment); Barker v. People, 20 Johns. 457, 458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823) (holding that disen-
franchising a citizen for a dueling conviction is a proper punishment, made at the
discretion of the legislature), affd, 3 Cow. 686 (N.Y. 1824)).
180. Id. at 2696.
181. Id, Justice Scalia suggested that there are "clear historical guidelines and
accepted practices" that allow courts to determine whether or not a particular mode
of punishment is 'cruel and unusual." Id. This sounds much like the "evolving stan-
dards of decency" set forth in Trop. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Jus-
tice Scalia, however, determined that this is an objective analysis, whereas a propor-
tionality analysis relies on the subjective determinations of judges. But even Justice
Scalia admitted that there are some absolutes: "one can imagine extreme examples
that no rational person... could accept." Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2696. But, he
argued that such examples, for the very reason that they are so horrible, are "certain
never to occur." Id. at 2696-97. Justice White felt that Justice Scalia's reassurances
offered "cold comfort indeed, for absent a proportionality guarantee, there would be
no basis for deciding such cases should they arise." lI at 2714 (White, J., dissent-
ing).
182. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2696-97.
183. Id at 2697 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1983)).
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Justice Scalia's difficulty with the first factor was in defining "grave"
offense."u Assessing "gravity" depends on "how odious and socially
threatening" one perceives the crime to be.' Justice Scalia illustrated
this difficulty with examples of various crimes and their punish-
ments," noting that there seems to be little logic in apportioning pen-
alties.I t He believed that "the Michigan Legislature, and not [the
Court], knows the situation on the streets of Detroit.""
Likewise, Justice Scalia had difficulties with Solem's second test:
comparing the sentence imposed to the sentences imposed for other
crimes in that jurisdiction.' He pointed out that "similarly grave" of-
fenses could receive disparate penalties for a variety of reasons.M For
example, one crime that is equally as "grave" as another might receive a
harsher sentence because it occurs more frequently. 9' In Solem, Helm
received a life sentence without possibility of parole for passing a "no
account" check and because he was a habitual offender." The same
sentence was authorized for crimes such as murder, treason, arson, and
kidnapping." The Solem Court also found that Helm's sentence was
harsher than those received by defendants who had committed more
serious offenses.'" Justice Scalia objected to the holding in Solem be-
184. Id. at 2698. In Justice Scalia's view, an assessment of the gravity of the pun-
ishment depends on the crime's severity and the threat it poses to society. Justice
Scalia reasoned that the legislature, and not the judiciary, is best equipped to make
such an assessment. Id.
185. Id. Justice Scalia asked rhetorically whether life imprisonment without possibili-
ty of parole might be an appropriate penalty for possession of, or possession with
intent to distribute, a quantity of heavy weaponry. Id.
186. Id. One such example is that both assault and the unauthorized reproduction
of the character or name "Smokey [the] Bear" are punished by up to six months imprison-
ment See 18 U.S.C. § 113(d) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 711 (1988).
187. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2697-98. However, the Court in So/em emphasized that
instead of determining that an offense was "grave" on its face, the offense should be
compared to the penalty imposed. So/em, 463 U.S. at 295-97. While courts may not be
in the best position to make judgments about the logic of a particular sentencing
hierarchy, surely judges possess the ability to recognize when an excessively harsh
penalty has been inflicted for a certain crime.




192. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297 (1983). See supra notes 127-28 and accompa-
nying text.
193. Solem, 463 U.S. at 298-99.
194. Id. at 299.
cause he reasoned that there is no objective basis for comparing the
gravity of two different crimes." 6
As for the third Solem test, Justice Scalia admitted that one can easi-
ly and objectively compare sentences for the same crime among differ-
ent jurisdictions."' He questioned the worth of such a test, however,
since states are entitled to punish, or not punish, different crimes in
different ways." Justice Scalia noted that such diversity is the result
of federalism.'" Our federal structure allows the states to pursue di-
vergent paths in their sentencing schemes, thus allowing each state to
best respond to its particular social conditions."
3. Proportionality Principle Cases Distinguished
Justice Scalia next analyzed the cases that established a proportional-
ity component in the Eighth Amendment.ss He found that Weems v.
United States"' contained language supporting two different interpre-
tations of the Eighth Amendment: first, that the Eighth Amendment
forbids torturous punishments,' and second, that it forbids dispropor-
195. Harmelin, Ill S. Ct. at 2698. In the close cases that Justice Scalia envisioned,
such comparisons would be quite difficult Id. For example, Justice Scalia found it
difficult to draw a distinction between the severity of possessing illegal narcotics and
the severity of possessing illegal weaponry. Id,
However, because some comparisons may be difficult to make does not vitiate
the worth of a comparative test in its entirety. There is, for example, an identifiable
difference between uttering a "no account" check and murder. A similar difference
exists between murder and possession of a controlled substance: the former is a
violent crime, while the latter is not. But see id. at 2706 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(rejecting the characterization of Harmelin's offense as "nonvi6lent").
196. ld. at 2698-99.
197. Id at 2698. There is, of course, no requirement that the states punish crimes
uniformly Id. at 2698-99. The aim of Solem was not to prohibit different states from
punishing the same crime differently. Rather, the third test was developed to provide
objective evidence of current social thought among the people of the different states.
For cases that apply a similar analysis, see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 291-92 (1983);
see atso Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-93 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 596 (1977). If one state punishes a crime far more severely than all others, that
state may be out of step with the rest of the country's assessment of the danger that
the crime poses. However, such a finding is far from conclusive evidence and must
be considered along with the other Solem factors. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92.
198. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2699.
199. I&
200. I& at 2699-701.
201. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
202. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2699. For example, the Court said in Weems:
No circumstance of degradation is omitted. It may be that even the cruelty
of pain is not omitted. He must bear a chain night and day. He is con-
demned to painful as well as hard labor. What painful labor may mean we
[Vol. 20: 747, 1993] Harmelin v. Michigan
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tionate penalties.' In Justice Scalia's view, the fact that in sixty years
no court used Weems to ban disproportionate penalties was sufficient
proof that Weems stood against only the barbarities of that particular
petitioner's sentence.'
Eventually, the Court did use Weems and other cases for the proposi-
tion that proportionality was indeed a component of the Eighth Amend-
ment.' However, Justice Scalia asserted that proportionality applies
only to capital cases and has no application to sentences of imprison-
ment.' In fact, the Court in Rummel noted that "outside the cointext
of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of
particular sentences have been exceedingly rare." ' However, at the
have no exact measure. It must be something more than hard labor. It may
be hard labor pressed to the point of pain.
Weema, 217 U.S. at 366-07.
203. Harmelin, III S. Ct. at 2699. For example, "'[s]uch penalties for such offenses
[as those conunitted by Weems] amaze those who ...believe that it is a precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] of-
fense.'" Id. (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 366-67).
204. Id. at 2700 (citing Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding
that a sentence of imprisonment may violate the Eighth Amendment solely because it
is disproportionate to the underlying offense)).
205. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (holding that capital punish-
ment for a felony-murder conviction violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against disproportionate penalties); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 684, 600 (1977) (finding
the death penalty disproportionate to the crime of rape).
206. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2701. Justice Scalia cited three cases in support of this
proposition: Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986), Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982), and Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). However, these three cases do not
refer to the proposition that proportionality should only apply in capital cases. Rath-
er, they propose that courts must take special care in the sentencing phase of a
death penalty case because of the irrevocability of the sentence. See Turner, 476 U.S.
at 35-36 (stating that prospective jurors in a capital case must be questioned as to
possible racial prejudice in light of the finality of the death sentence); Eddings, 455
U.S. at 110-17 (finding that evidence of violent family history and emotional distur-
bance were improperly excluded from consideration during sentencing); id. at 117-18
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that on account of the irrevocability of the death
sentence, the Court goes to great lengths to ensure that it is not "imposed out of
whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake."); Beck, 447 U.S. at 637 (requiring that the jury
be permitted to consider lesser included offenses in a death penalty case because the
defendant's life is at stake).
207. Rummel v. Estelie, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980). See Karl N. Metzner, Retroactivity,
Habeas Corpus, and the Death Penalty: An Unholy Alliance, 1991 DUKE LJ. 160, 160
(noting that Harmelin reaffirmed the proposition that the death penalty is fundamen-
tally different than a prison sentence).
same time, Rummel expressly recognized that the proportionality com-
ponent applies to prison sentences.' There is no compelling authority
as to why the proportionality component should apply to capital cases
and not to sentences of imprisonment. Certainly the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" does not contain
such a distinction."
4. Failing to Consider Individual Mitigating Factors Does Not Make
a Mandatory Prison Sentence Cruel and Unusual
Justice Scalia again applied the capital/noncapital distinction in re-
jecting Harmelin's second claim that his sentence violated the Eighth
Amendment because the trial court did not consider his individual cir-
cumstances in the sentencing phase."' As to this claim, precedent pro-
vided a more solid foundation for Justice Scalia's analysis."' Central
to Justice Scalia's argument is the fact that death is irrevocable, while
the legislature or the executive may reduce a sentence of imprisonment,
even a life sentence without possibility of parole."2 Also, Justice Scalia
found that the difference between a life sentence without possibility of
parole and other sentences of imprisonment will often be slight."3 But,
even when an obvious difference exists, Justice Scalia reasoned that "it
cannot be compared with death."" Therefore, the Court held that indi-
208. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11.
209. Harmelin, Ill S. CL at 2680, 2712 (White, J., dissenting). As Justice White
pointed out, the Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle should either apply to
both capital and noncapital cases or to neither, since the text of the amendment
does not distinguish between the two. Id. (White, J., dissenting). See also Martin R.
Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and the Eighth Amendment: Exces-
sive Punishment Before and After Rummel v. Estelle, 1980 DUKE LJ. 1103, 1129
(noting that the Eighth Amendment proscribes cruel and unusual "punishments" and
not merely cruel and unusual "executions").
210. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2701-02.
211. Because of the qualitative difference between the death penalty and sentences
of imprisonment, the former requires consideration of individual mitigation factors.
See supra note 90 and accompanying text. See also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (holding that in order to survive a constitutional challenge,
the death penalty must be imposed with due regard to the individual characteristics
of both the crime and the offender).
212. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702.
213. For example, a life sentence with eligibility for parole after 20 years inflicted
on a 66-year-old man, is basically equivalent to a life sentence without the possibility
for parole. Id.
214. Id. Justice Scalla's own examples, however, fail to demonstrate a great distinc-
tion between a death sentence and mandatory life imprisonment without possibility of
parole. The latter is, in effect, a form of a death sentence because the offender is
sentenced to die in prison.
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vidualized sentencing is only required in capital cases.1 5
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate opinion, in which Justices
O'Connor and Souter joined, concurring in part and concurring in Part
V of Justice Scalia's opinion, which held that individualized sentencing
is not required in noncapital cases.2"6 Justice Kennedy's thesis differed
from that offered by Justice Scalia in that Justice Kennedy believed that
the Eighth Amendment does contain a proportionality component.
However, he construed this principle narrowly, thereby voting to up-
hold Harmelin's sentence."'
1. Recognition of a Narrow Proportionality Principle
Although Justice Kennedy relied in part on Weems v. United
States" to find a narrow proportionality component in the Eighth
Amendment,'m he found that the Court's death penalty cases more con-
clusively established this principle. " In doing so, Justice Kennedy re-
jected Justice Scalia's suggestion that the proportionality principle ap-
plies only to death penalty cases.' Justice Kennedy then cited several
recent cases that had recognized a proportionality principle in both
capital and noncapital cases.'
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2702, 2707.08 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
217. Id at 2703 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
218. Id. at 2707-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
219. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
220. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
221. Id at 2703 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
800-01 (1982) (finding a capital sentence inappropriate for the crime of felony murder
where the defendant neither intended to kill nor in fact killed); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (holding that the death penalty is disproportionate to the crime
of raping an adult woman)).
222. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
223. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297 (1983)
(finding that life imprisonment without possibility of parole is disproportionate to a
conviction as a repeat offender for seven underlying nonviolent felonies); Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 & n.3 (1982) (holding that a 40-year sentence for possession
with intent to distribute nine ounces of marijuana is not a disproportionate penalty);
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.11 (1980) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits grossly disproportionate penalties); Hutto v. FInney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978)
(stating that the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are grossly dispropor-
2. Application of the Proportionality Component
After establishing the existence of a proportionality element in the
Eighth Amendment, Justice Kennedy attempted to determine how to
apply this concept in the future. He announced four guiding principles
gleaned from past decisions: (1) it is the proper duty of the legislature,
and not the courts, to determine the length of prison terms, (2) the
Eighth Amendment does not require the adoption of one particular
theory of criminal sentencing, (3) variations in the length of sentences
among jurisdictions are the natural result of our federal structure, and
(4) courts should employ objective factors in reviewing sentences
whenever possible. '
Justice Kennedy's first principle was that the legislature is in the best
position to set the length of prison sentences. In Justice Kennedy's
view, decisions regarding the proper punishment for criminals have a
broad impact on societal interests.' Furthermore, it is for the legisla-
ture to determine and implement questions of policy.m  Therefore, in
reviewing a sentence set within legislatively proscribed maximums,
courts should give broad deference to legislative intent." Justice Ken-
nedy did not, however, discuss what limits, if any, should be placed on
legislative choices in this area.
The second principle Justice Kennedy discussed was that the Consti-
tution does not command adherence to any particular theory of crimi-
nal sentencing.' The theories of retribution, deterrence, incapacita-
tion, and rehabilitation have exerted more or less influence over this
country's sentencing policies depending on which was more in tune
with current thought.' Over the years, courts have similarly debated
tionate to the underlying offense); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977)
(stating that the Eighth Amendment proscribes disproportionate penalties)).
224. Id. at 2703-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 2703 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Determinations about the nature and
purposes of punishment for criminal acts implicate difficult and enduring questions
respecting the sanctity of the individual, the nature of law, and the relation between
law and social order.*) See generally DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCI-
T I (1990).
226. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2703-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Gore v. Unit-
ed States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (holding that the legislature should decide ques-
tions of sentencing)).
227. Id. at 2703-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 2704 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
229. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a greater exploration of penological
theories as applied to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, see Harvey D. Ellis, Jr., Con-
stitutional Law: The Death Penalty: A Critique of the Philosophical Bases Held to
Satisfy the Eighth Amendment Requirements for Its Justification, 34 OKLA. L REV.
567 (1981) (analyzing various justifications for the death penalty and arguing that
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the question of whether sentencing should be mandatory or discretion-
ary.'m Apparently, Justice Kennedy's view is that the Constitution's
silence on the matter gives the legislature wide latitude in determining
which theory or theories to emphasize in devising a sentencing scheme.
Justice Kennedy's third principle was that the states' varying sentenc-
ing hierarchies result from our federal system of government." De-
pending on the local conditions and the particular theories of sen-
tencing embraced, different states may and do have widely varying
methods of punishing the same offense.' Thus, comparisons among
the different states may be of little or no help in a proportionality re-
view."
Lastly, Justice Kennedy asserted that courts should rely on objective
factors in determining whether a particular sentence is proportional to
a given crime.' "'The easiest comparison is between capital... and
noncapital punishment. '" ' However, no objective factors exist to
compare punishments varying in terms of years; the reasons that one
none yet offered stand up to close constitutional scrutiny); Mark A. James, Eighth
Amendment Proportionality Analysis: The Limits of Moral Inquiry, 26 ARiz L REV.
871 (1984) (reconciling the proportionality decisions of Helm and Coker while devel-
oping an extended Eighth Amendment analysis); David S. Mackey, Rationality Versus
Proportionality: Reconsidering the Constitutional Limits on Criminal Sanctions, 51
TENN. L. REV. 623 (1984) (proposing a rational basis test for criminal sentencing that
would give a criminal defendant the right to the least restrictive sentence).
230. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2704. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing United States v.
Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-47 (1978) (examining reform movement away from fixed
criminal penalties that gave sentencing judges broad discretion in determining criminal
punishments)).
Compare Mistretta v. United States, 448 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (holding that the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which reduced the discretion of federal Judges in
imposing criminal sentences, was a constitutional method of eliminating or reducing
variations in criminal sentences) with Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949)
(holding that a criminal statute permitting a sentencing judge to exercise wide discre-
tion in determining criminal punishments was constitutional).
231. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2704 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
232. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
233. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Kennedy agrees with Justice Scalia's
analysis of the third factor in the SDoem test: comparing sentences for the same
crime among different jurisdictions may be a futile exercise, since there is no re-
quirement for uniformity of punishments among the states. See supra note 197 and
accompanying text.
234. Harmelin, 111 S. CL at 2704 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980)).
235. Id. at 2705. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
294 (1983)).
crime should be punished with a sentence of seven years and another
with a sentence of ten years are hard to discem.' It is this lack of
objective standards that has made "'successful challenges to the propor-
tionality of particular sentences exceedingly rare.'" 7
All of these principles guided Justice Kennedy toward the conclusion
that the Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle is a narrow one.
He concluded that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits
only sentences grossly out of proportion to the underlying offense.'
3. Analysis of Petitioner's Sentence Under the Narrow Proportionali-
ty Principle
Justice Kennedy then turned his analysis toward applying this narrow
proportionality principle to Harmelin's sentence. As he pointed out,
Harmelin's sentence is exactly the same as that received by the petition-
er in Solem v. Helm:'a life without possibility of parole.'s However,
Justice Kennedy distinguished the underlying offenses committed by
Harmelin and Helm."' Helm's crime of uttering a no account check, as
well as his other felony convictions, were passive and nonviolent.A'
Harmelin's crime, possession of narcotics, is perhaps one of the most
serious crimes facing society today.' In Justice Kennedy's eyes, it
was this difference that justified Harmelin's sentence but not Helm's.'
Harmelin claimed that, like the crime at issue in Solem, his crime was
nonviolent and victimless. Justice Kennedy disputed that notion on
three grounds: (1) physiological changes caused by drug use can make
the user more predisposed to commit crime, (2) drug users may steal or
commit other crimes to get money to feed their addiction, and (3) drug-
related offenses are often accompanied by violent crime.' In applying
236. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
237. 1d. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272)).
238. Id, (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371
(1910) ("Eighth Amendnent prohibits 'greatly disproportioned' punishments."); Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) ("Eighth Amendment prohibits 'grossly
disproportionate' sentences."); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 271 (same); Solem, 463 U.S. at
288 (same)).
239. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
240. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
241. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy contrasted Helm's minor, proper-
ty-related offenses with Harmelin's crime of drug possession. Id. at 2705-06 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). Justice Kennedy asserted that Harmelin's crime was neither "nonvio-
lent [nor] victimless, [rather it] threatened to cause grave harm to society." Id, at
2706 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
242. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
243. Harmeiin, 111 S. Ct. at 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
244. Id. at 2706 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
245. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, 1989 DRUG USE
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what amounted to a rational basis test, Justice Kennedy concluded that
these facts support Michigan's determination that possession of 650 or
more gramns of cocaine warrants a sentence of life in prison without
possibility of parole.'
Furthermore, because of the "gravity" of Harmelin's offense, Justice
Kennedy reasoned that he need go no further in his Solem analysis."'
Justice Kennedy relied on language in Solem for the proposition that a
comparative analysis of the offender's sentence is required only if the
initial determination infers that the sentence is grossly disproportionate
to the crime.' Justice Kennedy, however, did not provide guidelines
as to when a sentence may be grossly disproportionate to the underly-
ing offense," nor did he establish how disproportionate that sentence
must be to continue with the comparative factors set forth in Solem.ss
Contrary to Justice Kennedy's assertion, the Court has used this type of
comparative analysis in the past for the initial determination of whether
a penalty is disproportionate to the crime."
FORECASTING ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1990); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., EPIDEMIOLOGICAL TRENDS IN DRUG ABUSE 107 (1990)).
246. Id (Kennedy, J., concurring). These factors seem to apply, however, more to
the addict at one extreme and the dealer at the other. The narcotics addict will steal
and rob to get money to buy drugs, while the dealer surrounds himself with illegal
firearms in conducting his illegal enterprise. And while the sheer volume of drugs
found in Harmelin's car supports an inference that he was one or the other or both,
the prosecution failed to prove either in court. Id. at 2717-18 (White, J., dissenting).
Harmelin was convicted of possession, not possession with intent to distribute. Id at
2718 (White, J., dissenting). Although he was armed when stopped by the police, he
had a legal permit for the weapon. Also, he had never been previously convicted of
a felony. While these mitigating factors certainly do not make Harmelin an innocent
man, neither do they support the assertion that the nature of his crime demands that
he spend the rest of his life in prison. See id, at 2719 (White, J., dissenting).
247. Id at 2707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
248. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 & n.16 (1983) (finding that an extended
analysis of proportionality in sentencing is required only in rare cases and that courts
may conduct a comparative analysis of the offender's sentence).
249. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2706-07 (Kennedy , J., concurring).
250. Id at 2707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
251. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 269-70 & nn.9-10 (1980) (comparing
petitioner's sentence to those received for similar crimes in other jurisdictions); Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-96 & nn.4-10 (1977) (using a comparative analysis to
determine that Georgia was the lone jurisdiction to inflict capital punishment for the
rape of an adult woman); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910) (com-
paring petitioner's sentence to those received for more serious crimes committed in
the United States).
4. Review of the Mandatory Nature of Harmelin's Sentence
Justice Kennedy began his analysis of the petitioner's second Eighth
Amendment attack by agreeing with Justice Scalia's distinction between
capital and noncapital sentences.' Justice Kennedy found additional
support in past noncapital cases.' Unlike Solem, the trial judge in
Harmein did not. use his discretion to choose a sentence near the top
of the range; Harmelin's sentence was mandatory.' Therefore, Justice
Kennedy reasoned that the courts should be more hesitant in overturn-
ing the will of the legislature than in reversing the decision of a single
judge.s
Although he found mandatory sentencing constitutional, Justice Ken-
nedy was reluctant to wholeheartedly endorse it. He noted that it may
be unwise to restrict individual sentencing where mitigating factors
weigh strongly against imposing the maximum sentence.' He opined,
however, that it may be more fair to put offenders on notice of their
sentence before they commit the crime, rather than allow the occasion-
ally unpredictable discretion of judges in sentencing hearings.' Addi-
tionally, Justice Kennedy observed that consideration of individual cir-
cumstances does occur through pre-sentence prosecutorial discretion or
post-sentence legislative or executive clemency.'
252. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
253. Id, (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919,
1928 (1991) (stating that the legislative branch may deny sentencing courts discretion
in determining the appropriate penalty)).
254. People v. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d 75, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), appeal denied,
434 Mich. 863 (1990), offd, 111 S. Ct. 2860 (1991). Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281-
82 & n.6 (1983). Mandatory sentencing has long been held constitutional. See
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-66 (1988) (holding that mandatory sen-
tences are a proper method of moderating the disparate sentencing practices of judg-
es); United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1978) (approving statutes that fix a
"range" of possible sentences); Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916) (rea-
soning that the legislature has the authority to fix and define criminal penalties).
255. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2708 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
256. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
257. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
258. Id. at 2708-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The wisdom of relying on the prosecu-
tor for restraint is not compelling, however, especially in light of the competitive
nature of the adversarial system. Although the prosecutor is charged with upholding
the interests of justice, she certainly is not in the best position to assess the individ-
ual circumstances of the defendant. Furthermore, executive or legislative clemency is
so seldom used that it provides little comfort to the offender punished by a dispro-
portionate sentence. See Brief of Petitioner, Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680
(1991) (No. 89-7272), available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file.
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C. The Dissenting Opinions of Justices Marshal, Stevens and White
Justice 'White delivered a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens
and Blackmun joined.' Justice Marshall delivered a brief dissenting
opinion of his own,' agreeing with Justice White's dissent with the
exception that Justice Marshall reasserted his view that the death penal-
ty violates the Eighth Amendment in all instances."
Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent in which Justice Blackmun
joined.2m Justice Stevens agreed with Justice White's opinion, but
stressed that where the sentence has no rehabilitative function, as in
Harmelin, the underlying offense must be so serious that "'society's
interest in deterrence and retribution wholly outweighs considerations
of reform or rehabilitation of the perpetrator.'"' In Justice Stevens'
view, Ronald Harmelin's crime of possessing a controlled substance did
not meet that burden.'
1. Justice White's Dissent and Criticism of Justice Scalia's Interpre-
tation of the Eighth Amendment
Justice White strongly disagreed with Justice Scalia's conclusion that
the Eighth Amendment does not include a guarantee against dispropor-
tionate sentencing.' His reasons were threefold. First, Justice White
disputed Justice Scalia's contention that if the Eighth Amendment were
meant to prohibit disproportionate penalties, it would say so explicit-
ly.' Justice White quoted Benjamin Oliver's statement: "'[S]hall it be
supposed that the power to fine is restrained, but the power to impris-
on is wholly unrestricted by [the Eighth Amendment]?"' Moreover,
Justice White noted that like the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause' and the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against "unreason-
259. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2709 (White, J., dissenting).
260. hL at 2719 (MarsA J., dissenting).
261. d (Marshall, J., dissenting).
262. 1l (Stevens, J., dissenting).
263. IcL (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 307
(1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
264. 1d. at 2720 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
265. AL at 2709 (White, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 2709-10 (White, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 2710 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting BENJAMIN OUVER, THE RIGHTs OF AN
AMERICAN CrZEN 185-86 (1832)).
268. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
able searches and seizures,"' the phrase "cruel and unusual" does not
have a set definition and is subject to widely-varying interpretations20
Second, Justice White addressed Justice Scalia's rejection of the no-
tion that the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are "cruel
and unusual" in relation to the crime itself." Justice Scalia questioned
the validity of this interpretation, noting that at the instant the Eighth
Amendment was adopted, every criminal punishment imposed by the
newly-formed federal government would necessarily be "unusual."' In
response, Justice White conceded that there were no benchmarks under
the new federal law for determining whether a criminal penalty was
"unusual." ' However, the states had existing criminal sentencing
schemes that could be used in determining whether or not a particular
sentence was "unusual."' Justice White further concluded that Justice
Scalia's interpretation would deprive the word "unusual" in the Eighth
Amendment of all meaning.27
Third, addressing Justice Scalia's argument that the framers chose
not to include a proportionality guarantee in the Eighth Amendment,
Justice White observed that existing legislative history does not support
such a contention.' Justice Scalia failed to provide any evidence to
establish that the framers considered and then discarded a proportion-
ality component.'m Moreover, Justice White extended this logic by
positing that if the framers meant to exclude proportionality from the
Eighth Amendment, they would have said so explicitly.
2
2. Prior Supreme Court Decisions Have Included the Proportionality
Guarantee in the Eighth Amendment
Justice White cited Weems v. United States'm as the first case to
hold that "'punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned
to [the] offense. '" 's As Justice White noted, subsequent courts have
followed Weems as authority for the prohibition of disproportionate
269. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
270. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2710 (White, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 2710 (White, J., dissenting). See id. at 2693.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 2710 (White, J., dissenting).
274. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
275. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (White, J., dissenting). See supra notes 161-79 and accompanying text for
Scalia's criticism.
277. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2710 (White, J., dissenting).
278. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
279. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
280. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2711 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Weems, 217 U.S.
at 367).
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penalties."' Indeed, Rummel v. Estelle,' a case on which Justice
Scalia relied in his analysis, expressly recognized that the proportionali-
ty principle developed in Gregg v. Georgia,m Coker v. Georgia,' and
Enmund v. Florida,'m also applies to sentences of imprisonment.'
Further, Justice White pointed out a logical flaw in Justice Scalia's
analysis. If, as Justice Scalia asserts, there is a proportionality compo-
nent in death penalty cases, it is unclear why such a component should
not also apply in noncapital cases."7 Rather, the fact that death penal-
ty cases have involved a proportionality guarantee at all refutes Justice
Scalia's argument that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does
not include a prohibition against disproportionate penalties.'m Accord-
ing to Justice White, Justice Scalia's construction would mean either
that the Eighth Amendment completely forbids the death penalty or
that the legislature may impose capital punishment without restric-
tion.' Since neither case holds true, proportionality must exist as an
element of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.'m
Justice White also rejected Justice Scalia's purely historical analysis
as a proper technique in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence."' Prior
cases advise courts to interpret the Eighth Amendment in light of
"'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.'"' Otherwise, changes in society might make the prohibitions
of the Eighth Amendment meaningless. Justice White quoted Justice
281. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (holding that sentences must be
proportionate to the underlying offense); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977)
(noting that the Eighth Amendment proscribes disproportionate penalties); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-02 (1958) (finding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
disproportionately severe punishments).
282. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
283. 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
disproportionate penalties).
284. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that the death penalty is disproportionate to
the crime of rape, and therefore, unconstitutional).
285. 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (holding that capital punishment is disproportionate to
the petitioner's felony-murder conviction, and thus, in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment).
286. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 263, 274 n.11.
287. See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 205.09 and accompanying text.
289. Harmelin v. Michigan, Il S. Ct. 2680, 2712 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
290. Id, (White, J., dissenting).
291. Id. (White, J., dissenting). See supra notes 161-79 and accompanying text.
292. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
McKenna's exhortation that, for an amendment to remain "'vital [it]
must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth.' " ' Justice White reasoned that this was the purpose of the tests
set forth in Solem v. Helm:' to objectively determine society's stan-
dards for imposing criminal sentences.'s He observed that courts have
had no trouble applying the Solem test.' The parties in Harmelin cit-
ed only four state cases that had to be reversed under Solem.' Like-
wise, the Solem review has not burdened federal courts either.' Fur-
ther, Justice White asserted that under Marbury v. Madison,' defer-
ring to the judgment of the legislature on the reasonableness of crimi-
nal penalties is an abdication of judicial responsibility.'s
Justice White also disputed Justice Kennedy's assertion that an analy-
sis under only the first Solem factor is sufficient for a proportionality
review."° He argued that because of the difficulty of conducting a pro-
293. Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
294. 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983).
295. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2712 (White, J., dissenting). See also Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (stating that courts should rely on objective factors for
determining societal standards).
296. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2712-13 (White, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 2713 n.2. See Ashley v. State, 538 So.2d 1181, 1185 (Miss. 1989) (pro-
claiming that a life sentence without possibility of parole is unconstitutionally severe
for petty theft and burglary involving only a few dollars); Naovarath v. State, 779
P.2d 944, 948 (Nev. 1989) (holding that a penalty of life imprisonment without possi-
bility of parole is unconstitutionally severe when imposed on a 13-year-old offender);
Clowers v. State, 522 So.2d 762, 763-65 (Miss. 1988) (holding that it is within the trial
court's power to reduce a mandatory 15-year sentence for a repeat offender where
the underlying offense was uttering a forged check); State v. Gilham, 549 N.E.2d 555,
558 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a felony conviction for possession of criminal
tools during commission of misdemeanor solicitation is grossly disproportionate and
violative of the Eighth Amendment).
298. See Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2713 n.3 (White, J., dissenting) (citing United
States v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1030, 1031-32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 207
(1990) ("'In view of the substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures and
sentencing courts, a reviewing court rarely will be required to engage in extended
analysis to determine that a sentence is not unconstitutionally disproportionate.'")
(quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983)); United States v. Benefield,
889 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that reviewing courts have limited pow-
er to change imposed sentences in light of the substantial deference accorded to
congressional intent); United States v. Savage, 888 F.2d 528, 530 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 959 (1990) ("[F]ine tuning the duration of imprisonment is not a
function of the Constitution.")).
299. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
300. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2713 (White, J., dissenting), (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 177 (1803) (*It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial de-
partment to say what the law is.")). Thus, penalties are not "legal" simply because
Congress has passed them. It is the Court's responsibility to review laws and make
sure that they conform to the dictates of the Constitution. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 2714 (White, J., dissenting). See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying
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portionality review, the Court in Solem required a combination of sever-
al factors for a proper analysis.' The Solem Court reasoned that a
sentence could conceivably satisfy one factor and yet grossly violate the
other two, and thus fail the proportionality test.m These factors to-
gether provide a "relative scale" that makes an objective proportionality
analysis possible.' Without comparing the sentence imposed to either
the sentences imposed for similar crimes in the same jurisdiction or the
sentence imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions, the Court is
left with only a relatively subjective determination of the gravity of the
crime compared to the severity of the penalty." The Court has consis-
tently rejected relying on the subjective determination of judges in crim-
inal sentencing.'s
Justice White proceeded to apply the Solem. factors to Harmelin's
sentence.' In addition to noting that Harmelin's sentence was the
most severe possible under Michigan law,' Justice White observed
that the sentence for Harmelin's crime was mandatory, gave no hope of
parole, and applied regardless of whether the state proved intent to
distribute." Justice White agreed with the rest of the Court that illegal
drug use is a grave problem in this country, but parted with the majori-
ty in its assessment that mere possession mandates such a severe pen-
alty in every case.' 0 After all, he noted, the Supreme Court held in Rob-
text.
302. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2714 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 274, 291 n.17 (1983)).
303. 1d. (White, J., dissenting). See Solem, 463 U.S. at 291, n.17.
304. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
305. Harmelin, 111 S.Ct. at 2715 (White, J., dissenting).
306. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 817 (1988) (stating that rather than
relying on Its own subjective judgment, the Court should rely on the state
legislature's expression as objective evidence of societal consensus); McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) (indicating that the Court also relies on jury deci-
sions as objeclive evidence of societal values); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275
(1980) (stating that sentences "should neither be nor appear to be merely the sub-
jective views of individual Justices"); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)
(stating that the Court should rely on history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and
jury sentencing decisions as objective factors in Eighth Amendment judgments); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (explaining that an assessment of contemporary
values must rely on objective indicia for an Eighth Amendment analysis).
307. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2716 (White, J., dissenting).
308. I& (White, J., dissenting). Michigan does not have the death penalty.
309. Id, (White, J., dissenting).
310. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White reasoned that, unlike possession with
intent to distribute, the consequences of mere possession of drugs affect the user
inson v. California3 " that addiction to narcotics cannot be made a
crime."' Even the problems accompanying cocaine trafficking and
use,3 13 such as violence and proclivity to commit other crimes, cannot
justify such a harsh punishment. "' According to Justice White, the
magnitude of the problem cannot justify ignoring the constitutional
rights of the defendant. "
In Michigan, a separate statute is aimed at those who manufacture,
deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute narcot-
ics."' Possession of narcotics does not involve the same degree of
culpability as drug trafficking. Nor does possession of illicit drugs in-
yoke the same "collateral consequences" in kind or degree as drug deal-
ing."' In Justice White's view, punishing a crime of lesser culpability
with the same penalty as a crime of greater culpability violates basic
proportionality principles. 8 Justice White also noted that, although
Harmelin had no previous felony convictions, he received the same sen-
tence as would a repeat offender.1
most directly. Therefore, a more severe penalty might be required for possession with
intent to distribute on account of its effects on society at large. Id. (White, J., dis-
senting).
311. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
312. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2716 (White, J., dissenting). See Robinson, 370 U.S. at
666.
313. See generaUy Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2706 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
314. Justice White reasoned that punishments "must be tailored to a defendant's
personal responsibility and moral guilt." I&. at 2716 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White likened cocaine's "collateral consequences" to those accompanying legal sub-
stances, such as alcohol, and their effects on society. Id. at 2717 (White, J., dissent-
ing). To punish Harmelin for the collateral consequences of cocaine possession would
be irrational and unjust Id. (White, J., dissenting). See Turner v. United States, 396
U.S. 398, 427 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (warning against eroding civil liberties in
the face of the "grave evil" of drug trafficking).
315. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2717 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Michigan Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (review of vehicle checkpoints designed
to detect drunk drivers under the Fourth Amendment); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508,
524 (1990) (holding that prosecution for death of accident victim after prosecution for
drunk driving violates Double Jeopardy Clause).
316. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7401(2)(a)(i) (West 1992) (mandating life impris-
onment without possibility of parole for manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with
intent to manufacture or deliver 650 or more grams of a -mixture containing cocaine).
317. Justice White also pointed out that the accompanying consequences of drug
possession, such as criminal activity, lost productivity, and health problems, are often
the consequences of addiction, which cannot be made a crime. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct.
at 2717 (White, J., dissenting). See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
318. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White expressed
concern that Michigan used the possession statute to avoid difficulties in proving
intent to distribute, and yet still arrived at the same penalty. Id. (White, J., dissent-
ing).
319. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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The third factor set forth in Solem compares the sentence received to
those imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.' No other
state punishes first-time possession of 672 grams of cocaine as severely
as Michigan does."' Under Justice White's analysis, it appears that
Michigan law is out of step with the national consensus on the is-
sue.' Justice White concluded that Harmelin's sentence failed the
test set forth in Solem, and thus violated the proportionality component
of the Eighth Amendment.'
V. IMPACT
Justice Marshall, in his final dissent on the United States Supreme
Court, stated: "Power, not reason, is the new currency of this court's
decisionmaking." The doctrine of stare decisis seems to carry less
320. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
321. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting). Alabama law imposes a
life sentence without parole for first time possession, but only for possessing ten or
more kilograms of cocaine. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-231(2)(d) (Supp. 1992). Under
federal sentencing guidelines, Harmelin's sentence could at most be ten years im-
prisonment. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N GUIDELNES MANuAL § 201.1
(1990).
322. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2718-19 (White, J., dissenting).
323. Id, at 2719 (White, J., dissenting). Since Justice White would have held
Harmelin's sentence unconstitutioral on proportionality grounds, he did not address
Harmelin's argument that his sentence also violated the Constitution because the sen-
tencing determination did not include a consideration of individual factors. Id. at 2719
n.8 (White, J., dissenting).
324. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Marshall's statement was in reference to the Supreme Court's decision to over-
turn Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S.
805 (1989), thus allowing victim-impact evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital
trial. In Payne, the Court reasoned that, although following the doctrine of stare
decisis is ordinarily preferred, the Court may deviate from precedent when it feels
the decisior are poorly reasoned or have proved untenable in practice. Payne, 111
S. CL at 2609-10 (Rehnquist, C.J. for the Court). The Court determined that it should
apply the doctrine of stare decisis more cautiously in constitutional cases, as the
possibility of corrective action by the legislative branch is almost impossible. Id. at
2610.
While Justice Marshall agreed with the Court in principle, he strongly criticized
the majority for departing from precedent without the necessary justification. Id. at
2621 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Arizona v. Ramsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
Justice Marshall found no changes in the law that undermined the reasoning of Booth
and Gathers. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Nor did he see a need to overrule prece-
dent based on experience or newly-discovered facts. Id. at 2621-22 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). The one thing that 'had changed in the interim between Booth and Payne,
weight with certain members of the Court, particularly when dealing
with the Bill of Rights.32 Certainly Justice Scalia's opinion in
Harmelin can fairly be characterized as paying less attention to estab-
lished precedent than to historical interpretation and legislative in-
tent.' Recently, in a speech at the University of Chicago Law School,
Justice Stevens warned that this "extraordinarily aggressive Supreme
Court has reached out to announce a host of new rules narrowing the
federal constitution's protection of individual liberties.""n? The present
Court's retreat from the strides that the Warren and Burger Coufts
made in protecting civil rights continues unabated.'m
however, was the Court's personnel. Id. at 2622 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall decried the willingness of the majority to overturn precedent
despite the dissent of four justices. Id. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He conclud-
ed.
The implications of this radical new exception to the doctrine of stare
decisis are staggering. The majority today sends a clear signal that scores of
established constitutional liberties are now ripe for reconsideration, thereby
inviting the very type of open defiance of our precedents that the majority
rewards in this case.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
325. See Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2686 ("We have long recognized, of course, that
the doctrine of stare decisis is less rigid in its application to constitutional prece-
dents [and this is] especially true of a constitutional precedent that is both recent
and in apparent tension with other decisions."); Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609-10 (stating
that the Court is not constrained to follow the doctrine of stare decisis in constitu-
tional cases where the underlying decisions are badly reasoned or unworkable). Cf.
Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Serv. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450
U.S. 147, 153 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (asserting that there should be a strong
presumption of validity afforded to recently-decided cases to afford the maximum
protection to the individual).
326. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decision
Making and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L REv. 68, 109, 121-22 (1991) (observing that
Justice Scalia argued in Harmelin to overrule Solem because it was erroneously rea-
soned, proposed an unworkable standard, and was inconsistent with the original
meaning of the Eighth Amendment, while Justice Kennedy would narrow, but not
overrule, Solem).
327. John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHi. L
REv. 13, 16 (1992) (positing that historical and textual analysis should not prevent the
Court from interpreting the Constitution in a dynamic and evolving manner). See Nat
Hentoff, Justice Stevens's Dissent, WASH. PoST, Jan. 18, 1992, at A23.
328. See J. Steven Beckett, Essay on the Bill of Rights: Whatever Happened to the
Bill of Rights? A Criminal Defense Lawyer's Perspective, 1992 U. Iu. L Rsv. 213,
216 (lamenting the demise of the Warren Court's protections of individual rights);
Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term: Forward: Anti-Discrimination and
Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L.
REV. 80, 13940 (1991) (contending that the Rehnquist Court has virtually ignored its
power to protect underrepresented social groups and to act as a check on legislative
power, especially in the area of criminal procedure); The Supreme Court 1990 Term:
Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L REV. 177, 185 & n.65 (1991) (illustrating the diminished
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Harmelin narrows the ability of the courts to review legislative deci-
sions in criminal sentencing. Although Harmelin did not expressly over-
rule Solent and its proportionality analysis, it certainly calls the viability
of the Solent test into question.' At the very least, Harmelin narrows
Solent to the point where it will have effect only in the most outrageous
of circumstances.' ° After Harmelin, the courts of appeal have been
consistent in rejecting Eighth Amendment claims." The Court in
Harmelin once more affirmed its commitment to defer to the state
legislatures on complex social issues. Although some commentators
welcome such deference as an example of judicial restraint,' others
are alarmed at the abandoned judicial check on legislative power.'
The opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan' has significance outside the
decision itself. Justice Souter, who replaced retiring Justice Brennan in
October 1990, cast the deciding vote in favor of the majority. Although
only ten of more than one hundred cases heard were probably decided
differently on account of Justice Souter's arrival, Harmelin was certain-
respect the current Supreme Court affords precedent in criminal procedure cases). Cf.
id. at 245-55 (approving Justice Scalia's approach to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
as a blow against judicial rule-making and supporting the decisions of the democrati-
cally-elected legislature).
329. See Crag W. Palm, RICO Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment: When Is Ev-
erything Too Much?, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 55 (1991) (noting that the inconsistent
opinions in Harmelin and the lack of a unifying rationale makes the various appel-
late courts' approaches even more important).
330. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.11 (1980) (stating that the narrow
proportionality principle would prohibit a penalty of life imprisonment for overtime
parking).
331. See, e.g., United States v. Knapp, 955 F.2d 566i 569-70 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding
that an 87-month sentence for conspiring to cultivate and deliver marijuana is within
statutory limits and, thus, does not violate the Eighth Amendment), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 175 (1992); United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479, 488 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
that life imprisonment without possibility of parole for marijuana trafficking is not
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
595 (1992); United States v. Lowden, 955 F.2d 128, 131 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a
seven-year sentence for distributing 7.7 grams of LSD is not a disproportionate sen-
tence under Harmelin).
332. Power, Reason and the Constitution, WAsH. TIMES, July 1, 1991, at D2.
333. Wisotsky, supra note 10, at 906 (arguing that disproportionate penalties will go
unchallenged if the courts endorse a sentence as constitutional merely because it was
enacted). See also Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct 2680, 2713 (1991) (White, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that if a punishment is deemed "legal" simply because it has been
legislatively mandated, the Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishments" will be rendered devoid of any meaning).
334. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
ly one of the most important.'
Justice Souter, a former state court judge and New Hampshire attor-
ney general, has provided the fifth vote for the conservative majority in
several key cases.' Harmelin is another example of the Court's re-
cent trend: making it more difficult for prisoners to regain their free-
dom by claiming a violation of their constitutional rights."
The Harmelin decision can also be seen as a part of the growing
"drug exception" to the Bill of Rights. The "War On Drugs," declared by
former President Reagan in 1982' and continued by the Bush Admin-
istration, has steadily eroded defendants' rights in criminal procedure,
including the rights against unreasonable searches and seizures,' the
right to counsel,' the right to privacy," and the rights found in the
335. Richard Willard, Digging In, But Not Tearing Down, LEGAL TIMES, July 1, 1991,
at 26.
336. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2460-63 (1991) (uphold-
ing a state ban on nude dancing); Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1767-69 (1991)
(upholding a ban on federally funded abortion counseling); Arizona v. Fulminante, 111
S. Ct. 1246, 1257-61 (1991) (allowing application of the harmless error rule to coerced
confessions).
337. Richard Willing, What Supreme Court Vote on Cocaine Case Means, GANNErr
NEWS SERV. June 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file.
338. See Wisotsky, supra note 10, at 890 & nn.9-10.
339. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. CL 2382, 2385-88 (1991) (holding constitu-
tional officers' practice of boarding passenger buses and asking for permission to
search luggage); California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1985-91 (1991) (upholding
warrrantless search of container within a car when there is probable cause to search
only the container); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-25 (1984) (establishing a
.good faith" exception to exclusionary rule for warrants issued on less than probable
cause); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241-46 (1983) (adopting "totality of circum-
stances" test for determining whether informant's tip is reliable for purposes of
search warrant); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 817-24 (1982) (approving war-
rantless search of automobiles, as well as closed containers inside the vehicle).
340. See, e.g., The Comprehensive Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1987)
(stating that upon conviction of client for controlled substances violation, prosecutor
can ask that fee be forfeited to United States as proceeds of a criminal enterprise);
Deficit Reduction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (1984) (requiring attorney's fees of more
than $10,000 in cash to be reported to Internal Revenue Service, along with name,
address, and tax number of client); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 614-16
(1989) (finding that prohibiting a defendant from using assets seized in forfeiture
proceedings to retain counsel did not violate the Sixth Amendment); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 260-63 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(approving, as not violative of attorney-client privilege, the use of grand jury subpoe-
na to compel defense counsel to disclose amount, source, and method of payment
for fee received).
341. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 182-89 (1990) (upholding a war-
rantless entry based upon the consent of a third party whom police reasonably
believed to possess common authority over premises); California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 39-44 (1988) (holding that a warrantless search of garbage bags for items in-
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Eighth Amendment."i For example, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986' provides, among other things, strict punishments for those con-
victed of drug-related offenses.3" The Act imposes mandatory mini-
mum sentences for a wide array of drug-related crimes. For example, it
punishes possession with intent to distribute five kilograms of cocaine
with a mandatory prison term of ten years to life.3" These long sen-
tences of imprisonment combined with mandatory minimums should
implicate the Eighth Amendment guarantee against disproportionate
penalties.
However, the present public outcry over illegal drugs has strongly
influenced judicial review.' The majority of the Court has consistent-
ly deferred to the will of Congress in expanding the powers of law en-
forcement agencies. " ' Without the Supreme Court providing a much-
dicative of narcotics use did not violate the defendant's reasonable expectation of
privacy); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (upholding the use of
drug-detecting dogs to conduct a sniff examination of luggage without probable
cause); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-85 (1983) (approving the use of
transmitters or beepers to conduct surveillance of suspects).
342. Wisotsky, supra note 10, at 907-10.
343. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-66 (1988). The purpose of this
Act Is to
strengthen Federal efforts to encourage foreign cooperation in eradicating il-
licit drug crops and in halting international drug traffic, to improve enforce-
ment of federal drug laws and enhance interdiction of illicit drug shipments,
to provide strong Federal leadership in establishing effective drug abuse treat-
ment and education programs, to expand Federal support for drug abuse
treatment and rehabilitation efforts, and for other purposes.
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (Oct. 27, 1986) (pref-
ace).
344. Wisotsky, supra note 10, at 904. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1) (Supp. 1992).
345. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (Supp. 1992).
346. See, e.g., California v. Cirolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-15 (1986) (validating aerial
surveillance over private property); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-25 (1984)
(creating a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule); Albernaz v. United States,
450 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1981) (upholding consecutive sentences of imprisonment for vio-
lation of two different conspiracy statutes arising from a single agreement to import
marUuana).
347. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5 (1984) (upholding the use of the
*drug courier profile' to stop and question citizens); United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 706 (1983) (approving the use of drug-sniffing dogs to inspect luggage without
probable cause); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983) (ap-
proving issuance of a warrant on an undisclosed informant's tip); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (upholding the power of drug agents to search ships
in inland waterways without a warrant or probable cause); United States v. Ross, 456
needed check on a Congress zealously enacting increasingly stringent
drug-offense laws, the constitutional rights of suspected drug offenders
are quickly vanishing beneath the waves of the current drug hyste-
ria.' The erosion of civil liberties might be tolerable in some seg-
ments of society if it resulted in less crime and the elimination of the
drug problem. But such has not been the case. Although the "War on
Drugs" has changed public attitudes towards the casual use of illegal
narcotics, it has had less success in curbing drug-trafficking and the
accompanying violence.'
For Ronald Harmelin, the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Peo-
ple v. Bullock' provided the relief he did not find from the United
States Supreme Court. In Bullock, the Michigan Supreme Court held
that the statute imposing mandatory life imprisonment for possession of
650 or more grams of cocaine violated the Michigan Constitution."l
U.S. 798, 821 (1982) (allowing warrantless searches of cars and containers inside).
348. Wisotsky, supra note 10, at 904.
349. See supra notes 3-14 and accompanying text. The administration's budget for
1992 drug control funding was $12.7 billion and is expected to increase by $780 mil-
lion in 1993. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on National Drug Control Strate-
gy, FED. NEWS SERV., Feb. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omi File.
Meanwhile, an estimated 200,000 more Americans reported frequent cocaine use than
the year before. Id. See generally STEVEN WISOTSKY, BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN THE
WAR ON DRUGS (1986); David Boaz, A Drug-Free America--or a Free America?, 24
U.C. DAVIS L REv. 617 (1991) (emphasizing the futility of prohibiting narcotics, and
proposing a framework to legalize drugs that would, among other things, lessen govern-
ment intrusion on constitutional rights); Michael J. Flannery, Abridged Too Far:
Anticipatory Search Warrants and the Fourth Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L REV.
781 (1991) (illustrating the decline in Fourth Amendment protection due in part to
public concern over drug trafficking); Wisotsky, supra note 10.
350. 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992). In Bullock, the defendants were convicted of
possessing 650 or more grams of cocaine and sentenced to life in prison without
possibility of parole. Id. at 868. The defendants challenged their sentences under the
Michigan Constitution. Id. The court reasoned that the language of the Michigan
Constitution prohibiting "cruel or unusual" punishments was more protective than the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishments. Id. at 872.
Additionally, Michigan adopted the "cruel or unusual" language 50 years after the
United States Supreme Court had interpreted the words "cruel" and "unusual" as
prohibiting disproportionate penalties. Id. at 872-73. See supra notes 47-55 and accom-
panying text. Thus, the court found reason to believe that Michigan adopted its
constitutional language with an intent different from the interpretation Justice Scalia
offered of the Eighth Amendment in Harmelin. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d at 872-73 & n.15.
Finally, the court observed that Michigan precedent provided a third "compelling
reason" for interpreting the Michigan Constitution as broader than the United States
Constitution. Id. at 873. See People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. 1972) (hold-
ing that a mandatory sentence of 20 years for selling any quantity of marjuana
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
351. Bullock, 485 N.W. 2d at 877. The Michigan Constitution provides in pertinent
part: "Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; cruel
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The state supreme court's decision commuted the sentences of all de-
fendants convicted under the statute.' Of course, this decision pro-
vides small comfort to defendants in drug-related cases in other
states.' For them, the Supreme Court of the United States has
opened the door wide for state legislatures to enact severe mandatory
penalties across the board.'
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Harmelin leaves the future of the proportionality
principle as a part of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in some doubt.
For now, it means simply this: death penalty cases require proportional-
ity and individual sentencing, while sentences of imprisonment do not
in all but the most extreme cases. However artificial this distinction
may seem, the Court is unlikely to alter the placement of this bright
line anytime soon. The majority's philosophy of deference to the legisla-
tive branch, combined with the current "get tough" attitude towards
or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted; nor shall witnesses be unreasonably de-
tained." MICH. CONST., art. 1, § 16.
352. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d at 878. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 333.7403(2)(a)(i)
(West 1992).
353. Defendants in drug-related prosecutions across the country may have to rely,
like Ronald Harmelin, on the state courts to safeguard their individual rights. See Con-
stitutional Law Coqference: Choper Canvasses Media Reaction, 61 U.S.LW. 2237
(Oct. 27, 1992) (noting that a number of state appellate courts have granted criminal
defendants greater protection under the state constitution in response to United
States Supreme Court decisions).
354. The Court, it seems, has Ignored Chief Justice Warren's admonition that the
Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)., This oft-quoted statement reflected Chief Justice Warren's belief that
[t]he provisions of the Constitution are not time-worn adages or hollow shib-
boleths. They are vital, living principles that authorize and limit governmental
powers in our Nation. They are the rules of government. When the constitu-
tionality of an Act of Congress [or the act of a state legislature] is chal-
lenged in this Court, we must apply those rules. If we do not, the words of
the Constitution become little more than good advice.
Id. at 103-04.
Rather than move forward in our concept of "civilized" standards of punishment,
it appears that our society is prepared to slide backward. Whether out of frustration or
vengeance, legislatures have responded to the twin problems of drugs and crime by
locking the offenders away for ever-longer sentences of imprisonment. Without the
Eighth Amendment to provide a check on the legislative branch and as protection for
individual rights, prison sentences are free to grow at the whim of the majority.
criminal and drug-related activity, preclude any hopes of general pro-
portionality in sentencing for the present. Yet, times change. Eventually,
the "evolving standards of decency" referred to in Trop v. Dulles'
may effect a change in public attitudes and Supreme Court decisions so
that rehabilitation, and not retribution, is the main focus of our criminal
sentencing scheme. But for now, the Supreme Court is content to let
state legislatures slam the prison doors on criminal defendants. And,
after Harmelin, the Eighth Amendment no longer provides a key.
ScoT K. PETERSEN
355. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
